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EXPLORING METHODS TO IMPROVE
MANAGEMENT AND FAIRNESS IN PRO SE
CASES: A STUDY OF THE PRO SE DOCKET IN
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Jonathan D. Rosenbloom*
INTRODUCTION
Lost in the world of legal procedure and substantive case law, the
pro se litigant' often finds herself confused and overwhelmed, if not
frustrated and bitter.2 Throughout their litigation, pro se litigants are
confronted with numerous difficulties including complying with
procedural rules,3  understanding substantive legal concepts,
* B. Arch., Rhode Island School of Design, 1994; B.F.A., Rhode Island School of
Design, 1994; J.D., magna cum laude, New York Law School, 1997. Associate
Director of the Center for New York City Law, New York Law School. The Author
was a staff attorney in the Pro Se Office in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York from 1998-2001. The views expressed in this Article
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the policies or opinions of
the Southern District of New York. The Author would like to thank New York Law
School Professor Larry Grosberg for his thoughtful critiques and valuable
suggestions regarding the Article, and the Pro Se Office for all its support.
1. The term "pro se" is Latin for "for oneself" or "on one's own behalf."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999). The term is typically used to define
someone who is party to a legal action and proceeds without the aid of counsel. Id. at
1237.
2. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE
LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 53
(1998) [hereinafter MEETING THE CHALLENGE] ("[Jiudges variously describe the
feelings on the part of self-represented litigants ... as a belief that 'the system is
fixed,' a 'feeling of isolation,' and a 'sense of unfairness, helplessness, and futility."');
Dianne Molvig, Violence and the Judicial System: Stemming the Tide of Violence in
Our Courthouses, 70 WIS. LAW., July 1997, at 10, 13 (describing pro se litigants as
"frightened, confused and need[ing] help through the legal system"); Vernetta L.
Walker, Legal Needs of the Public in the Future, 71 FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 42, 44
(describing pro se litigants as "confused"); Marc Perkel, Representing Yourself in
Court (Pro Se) Pros and Cons, at http://www.perkel.com/pbl/prose.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2002) ("The first thing you need to know when representing yourself is
the.., system is designed to screw you over.").
3. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-84 (1984) ("A defendant does not
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articulating relevant factual allegations, and simply knowing how to
proceed with their action. Despite the liberal reading granted to pro
se litigant pleadings,4 pro se litigants are almost unanimously ill
equipped to encounter the complexities of the judicial system.
In wrestling with these complexities, pro se litigants often turn to
the court for guidance Judges and court staff, restricted in their
ability to assist the litigants,6 find themselves feeling frustrated by the
pro se litigant's inability to grasp legal concepts or to comply with the
rules of civil procedure.7 In order to respond effectively to pro se
have a constitutional right to receive personal instruction from the trial judge on
courtroom procedure. Nor does the Constitution require judges to take over chores
for a pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a
matter of course."); Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) ("[T]he right of self-
representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.");
Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 391 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) ("There is
consequently no necessity, no reason, why government should in civil trials be
hampered or handicapped by the strict and rigid due process rules the Constitution
has provided to protect people charged with crime."). But see Merritt v. Faulkner,
697 F.2d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("It is unfair to deny a litigant a lawyer and then trip him up on [procedural]
technicalities.").
4. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), a
pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only
be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."
Id. (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)); see also McPherson v. Coombe,
174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that courts "read the pleadings of a pro
se plaintiff liberally and interpret them 'to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest."') (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
5. See COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, Recommendation 93
(1995) [hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS];
MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3.
6. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (setting forth restrictions on the
ability of the court staff to give advice).
7. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1 (1991); James B. McLindon, Lawyer Referral
Services and the Pro Se Litigant, 40 JUDGES' J. 28 (2001) ("Courts are doubly
frustrated by" pro se litigation). As one judge bluntly stated:
No one likes pro se litigants-the jury does not have much sympathy for
them at all-they put a real burden on the court staff, especially the clerk,
post verdict. They tend to think they are 'unique' and frequently call and
pester staff long after the case is concluded.
Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13,
19 (1998); see also Junda Woo, More People Represent Themselves in Court, But is
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litigant inquiries, the court staff is required to have not only a
thorough understanding of the legal issues, but also the ability to
describe the issues in an easily accessible manner. This is not an easy
task, especially when the litigant is enraged, frustrated, and has a
limited education and/or English language ability.8
Court personnel, accustomed to experienced counsel, are rarely
trained to address the anger, fear, frustration, and communication
barriers that are common hurdles when working with pro se litigants.
Most court employees may have some legal knowledge, however,
they rarely have any formal training in working with pro se litigants,
the non-legal issues that arise, and the complexities of describing the
law in an easily accessible manner.9 New employees learn by
observing other employees' interaction with the litigants for several
weeks, but do not receive any formal training from professionals on
Justice Served?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1993, at Al ("[N]umbers are exploding ....
As these hordes of non-lawyers stumble along, they clog systems that aren't designed
to accommodate amateurs, creating a host of new challenges for court
administrators."). A 1998 survey of state court judges found that the number one
problem facing judges in pro se cases is delays, followed by maintaining impartiality,
attendance, attorney impatience, feelings of resentment by the litigant, and enforcing
procedural rules. See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 118; Russell
Engler, And Justice For All-Including The Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting The Roles
of The Judges, Mediators, And Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2056 n.308 (1999)
("Judges and other courtroom personnel frequently 'devote significant court time to
explaining the intricacies of the bankruptcy system to confused pro se debtors....
Judicial proceedings involving pro se debtors may be time consuming and frustrating
for all concerned."'); Sean Munger, Bill Clinton Bugged My Brain!: Delusional
Claims in Federal Courts, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1820 (1998) (noting that pro se
litigants often try the patience of court staff).
8. I have found from my own experiences at the Pro Se Office that a significant
portion of the time I spend working with litigants is devoted to trying to
communicate with the litigants, and to focus them on their litigation. See also Lurana
S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 295, 301 (describing
"[m]any [pro se litigants as] illiterate, most are unschooled in the law, and some are
in need of mental health counseling." (quoting conference members at JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 65
(1995))); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 7, at 1.
9. The Pro Se Office in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, which has one of the most progressive and largest pro se offices in the
country, is no exception to this. The Office has eight attorneys and seven writ clerks,
several of whom speak Spanish, assisting the fifty judges of the Court and processing
over 2,000 pro se cases per year. The Office also provides numerous services to pro
se litigants including a public walk-up window where pro se litigants can ask
procedural advice from a writ clerk or an attorney. The employees, however, do not
receive formal training on how to communicate with pro se litigants. See also Engler,
supra note 7, at 1994 (quoting a staff attorney in the Western District of Louisiana:
"We have been told here.., not to give 'legal advice' but I have never heard this
term defined so I do struggle with what to tell [pro se litigants]." (citation omitted)).
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how to communicate with pro se litigants and address their issues.
Communicating with pro se litigants is made even more difficult
because the law governing what advice, if any, can be given to assist
pro se litigants is decidedly difficult to comprehend. If a pro se
litigant is fortunate enough to have access to a member of the court,"
her questions will often go unanswered as she is introduced to the
standard maxim that court personnel can provide: "procedural but
not substantive advice."'1 While the difference between procedural
and substantive advice may be instinctively ascertainable by some
attorneys, it is not only difficult to explain to a lay person but, more
importantly, it is almost never understood by pro se litigants-thus
adding to their frustration."
The unique issues raised by pro se litigants are also prevalent in
pro se litigant pleadings. Court personnel reviewing pro se pleadings
are charged with the responsibility of deciphering why the submission
was filed, what the litigant is seeking, and what claims she may be
making. This task is particularly difficult because the submission may
be rambling and illogical, if not completely illegible. While it is not
uncommon to encounter completely frivolous, if not delusional, pro
se complaints, it is essential and fundamental that the court reviews
each complaint for any possible claim. 3 This, again, is a task
10. While the Southern District of New York has at least one attorney and one
writ clerk assisting the public every day, as well as several Spanish-speaking
employees on staff, most courts do not provide these services. See also MEETING THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3.
11. See also Engler, supra note 7, at 1992-93 n.25 (citing In re Amends. to the Fla.
Small Claims Rules, 601 So. 2d 1201, 1216 (Fla. 1992) ("'The clerk is not authorized
to practice law and therefore cannot give you legal advice on how to prove your
case."'); State v. Walters, 411 S.E.2d 688, 691 (W. Va. 1991) (stating that no
magistrate clerk may act as an attorney for any party); Standing Comm. on the
Delivery of Legal Servs., AM. BAR ASS'N, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-
REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT 24-25 (1994) ('[I]t is important that court clerks
not practice law by giving substantive legal advice."'); John Greacen, 'No Legal
Advice From Court Personnel' What Does That Mean?, 34 JUDGES' J., Winter 1995,
at 10. ("Members shall not give legal advice unless specifically required to do so as
part of their office position." (quoting THE NAT'L ASS'N FOR CT. MGMT., MODEL
CODE OF CONDUCT art. 11 (B))).
12. In the numerous times I have witnessed an exchange containing this phrase, I
have never seen either party benefit. Usually, the court employee, the pro se litigant,
or both become agitated, further impeding the litigant's chances of a successful or
satisfying experience with the court. See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at
34-35.
13. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972)); see also McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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requiring extensive time and patience. 4
The reality is that an overburdened court does not always have the
time and patience to fully weigh each allegation and to review every
claim no matter how meritorious. With the perceived increase in pro
se cases, courts are forced to fashion methods to resolve cases
quickly. The result is that pro se cases, which often require more of
the court's time and patience than cases represented by trained
counsel, may be given cursory or inadequate assistance 6 - making it
extremely difficult for the pro se litigant to prosecute her case,
frustrating the litigant's right of access to the courts, 7 and risking the
possibility that a meritorious claim will be improperly dismissed."8
Faced with these issues and experiencing my own frustrations, 9 I
did some preliminary research into what measures, if any, other
14. See Bill Brooks, Working Group Has Pro Se Litigation Action Plan, 43 RES
GESTAE, May 2000, at 12 (quoting Indiana State Court Judge David H. Coleman, "A
great deal of time is spent in court and by staff members dealing with pro se
litigants.... They don't understand the process; they're not given good instructions
for getting through the system.").
15. Most reports indicate that pro se cases are on the rise. See MEETING THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3, 9; Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 13; McLindon, supra
note 7, at 28; Hon. John M. Stanoch, Working with Pro Se Litigants: The Minnesota
Experience, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 297 (1998); see also Michael A. Cooper,
Providing Help to the "Self-Represented," 14 44TH STREET NOTES, Mar. 1999, at 1;
Engler, supra note 7, at 1987 n.1. The number of pro se cases filed in the Southern
District of New York, however, has remained relatively consistent for the past five
years (2,256 cases in 1995; 2,293 cases in 1996; 2,251 cases in 1997; 1,765 cases in 1998;
2,049 cases in 1999). General data on pro se cases collected by the Pro Se Office for
the years 1995-1999 (on file with Pro Se Office).
16. See Brooks, supra note 14, at 12; see also MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra
note 2, at 34-38; Munger, supra note 7, at 1812.
17. The right of access to the courts is born out of several constitutional
provisions. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
(finding right of access in the First Amendment right to petition the government for
the redress of grievances (see U.S. CONST. amend. I)); Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371,
377-78 (1971) (finding right of access in Due Process Clause (see U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1)); Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 142 (1907) (finding right
of access in Privileges and Immunities Clause (see U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2))).
18. See Munger, supra note 7, at 1812; see also Michael Zachary, Dismissal of
Federal Actions and Appeals Under 28 U.S. C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), 42 U.S. C.
§ 1997e(c) and the Inherent Authority of the Federal Courts: (A) Procedures for
Screening and Dismissing Cases, (B) Special Problems Posed by the "Delusional" or
"Wholly Incredible" Complaint, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 975, 1048 (1999-2000).
19. During the past three years as a staff attorney in the Pro Se Office, I have
frequently wrestled with my own frustrations while working with pro se litigants. No
matter whether I was trying to work with an enraged, erratic, or an uneducated
litigant, I dealt with a constant sense of frustration because I knew that the litigant
was unprepared for an extremely difficult, if not insurmountable, task.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
courts and court staff have implemented to address the issues raised
by pro se litigants. I quickly discovered that there were very few
guides or studies on pro se litigation. While there was a sizeable
amount of commentary and anecdotal information, there was only
one study that compiled actual data on federal pro se cases.2" The
study, however, was performed in the Northern District of California
in San Francisco in 1993, prior to the enactment of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") on April 26, 1996,21 which
significantly altered the processing and adjudicating of pro se cases.22
Furthermore, that study only included cases filed during 1993, and did
not include pro se cases filed by inmates, which amount to more than
60% of pro se cases.2 3 There were no other studies examining pro se
dockets in federal court, and I was unable to find any other data that
tracked, detailed, or analyzed the actual filing and litigating of pro se
cases.
I also discovered that while several district courts had developed
responses to address the pro se anomaly, these responses were done
in a vacuum with little or no statistical data reviewing actual pro se
cases."4 Similarly, little or no statistical data was reported setting forth
which, if any, of the responses have been effective.' Moreover, each
20. See Spencer G. Park, Note, Providing Equal Access to Equal Justice: A
Statistical Study of Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigation in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 832
(1997) (presenting results from a study on non-prisoner pro se litigation in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco).
21. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title VIII, § 804(a), (c)-
(e), 110 Stat. 1321-73, 1321-74, 1321-75 (1996).
22. For a discussion of the prominent changes the PLRA had on pro se litigation,
see infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 40; see also Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts,
Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 475, 479 (2002) (citing David Rauma & Charles Sutelan, Analysis of Pro Se
Case Filings in Ten U.S. District Courts Yields New Information, 9 FJC DIRECTIONS 6,
6 (1996) (reporting that 21% of all case filings in ten districts in the period of 1991-
1994 involved pro se litigants, and that prisoner petitions constituted 63% of these
filings)).
24. See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3, 9; PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 5, at Recommendation 35; Snow, supra
note 8, at 301 (calling for a "broad-based study. .. to evaluate the impact of pro se
litigation and recommend changes." (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
supra note 8, at 64)); infra note 30 (detailing the lack of relevant sources studying pro
se litigation).
25. See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3, 9; PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 5, at Recommendation 35; Snow, supra
note 8, at 301 (calling for a "broad-based study.., to evaluate the impact of pro se
litigation and recommend changes.") (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
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district court's response had been constructed in the absence of a
cohesive overall plan or any communication among the district
courts.26
In an effort to fill this void, this Article begins with a statistical
study of non-habeas corpus, non-bankruptcy pro se litigation in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The goal is to collect and organize critical data previously unavailable
and to report the data in a usable format.
Part I begins by thoroughly reviewing the current lack of data on
pro se dockets in federal district courts. Part I continues by setting
forth the parameters used for this Study, designed to respond to the
lack of existing data and the inability to access pertinent information.
Part II analyzes the results of the study in order to present
information previously unavailable, such as what aspects of pro se
litigation are most troubling for the court, and what the prototypical
pro se case is, if there is one. Part 11 seeks to determine where
innovative programs should be directed to best assist the litigant and
alleviate the burdens on the court. It also examines how the PLRA
has affected pro se litigation. Part III builds on this analysis by
suggesting a cohesive plan to enable the courts to function more
smoothly. The primary focus in making these suggestions is two-fold:
to provide the litigant with the necessary means to fairly prosecute
her case, and to increase court efficiency. These goals can work
together, in that the more efficiently the system works, the more time
the court has to review meritorious cases and assist pro se litigants,
thereby giving the litigant her "day in court."
This Article should not be understood, however, to be advocating
pro se litigation. While the Article does explore the tension between
encouraging pro se litigation and increasing the efficiency of the
courts, I believe the best solution to the issues raised by pro se
litigation is to obtain legal counsel.27 Obtaining legal counsel not only
protects the litigant's rights, but it also assists the court by allowing
supra note 8, at 64); infra note 30 (detailing the lack of relevant sources studying pro
se litigation).
26. See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 19 ("The responses discussed
to this point are interesting in that they denote a clear lack of uniformity across
courts and judges with respect to the handling of pro se litigants, raising questions
about the consistency and quality of justice administered to them.").
27. See infra Part III; see also Darrell W. Ringer, Pro Se Litigants, W. VA. LAW.,
Mar. 2000, available at http://www.wvbar.org/barinfo/lawyer/2000/marchO0/coverpg.htm
(arguing that the best way to assist pro se litigants is to find them legal
representation).
2002]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
attorneys to screen out frivolous claims prior to filing. Since
obtaining legal counsel is not always possible, alternatives are set
forth which explore a variety of programs aimed at encouraging
assistance in pro se litigation, treating pro se litigants with dignity,
and effectively and judiciously addressing the present and growing
issues raised by pro se litigation. Finally, while the Article refers to
and often discusses numbers and percentages, it is essential to
remember that pro se litigants are people who believe they have been
wronged, and are entitled to access to the courts and due process
under the law.
I. THE STUDY
Who files a case pro se? What are their lawsuits about? What
issues do they raise? How are their complaints processed and
resolved? These are all questions this Article addresses by
performing a statistical study unlike previous studies on pro se
litigation. This Part begins by reviewing the current shortage of, and
need for, data on federal pro se litigation. The Section continues by
presenting the parameters used for the study, which were designed to
address the current lack of data on federal pro se litigation.
A., Existing Data
The common perception of pro se litigants as being abusive" and
creating a burden on the court system29 is not a well-documented
perception.3" There has been little statistical evidence from this
28. Munger, supra note 7, at 1813 (describing the delusional and frivolous claims
of pro se litigants, files "solely for the harassment value they have on opponents or
courts or... by persons who are well-meaning but mentally ill.").
29. Gender Comm., Report of the Working Committees to the Second Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
117, 299-300 (1997) (stating that the large number of pro se cases presents a problem
of judicial management); John Gibeaut, Turning Pro Se, 85 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (1999)
(indicating that the increase in pro se litigants has resulted in a greater burden on
district court personnel, especially clerks, who are called upon to render unofficial
assistance for unrepresented litigants lacking understanding of basic court
procedure); see also Jay Carlisle, Second Circuit 1999-2000 Res Judicata
Developments, 20 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 75, 88 (2000); Mark Hansen, Courts Saving
Time and Trees, 85 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (1999) (noting that new electronic filing systems
must be made accessible to pro se litigants, resulting in increased training and access
costs); Marie Higgins Williams, Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel, and the Judge,
A Proposal for Better Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 816 (2000) (citing
reasons pro se litigators choose self-representation).
30. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 3; Gibeaut, supra note 29, at 28;
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district, or any other, analyzing who the pro se litigant is, what claims
she raises, and how the claims are resolved. As stated above, there is
currently no study relying on actual data recording the processing and
resolution of federal pro se litigation after the enactment of the
PLRA on April 26, 1996. The absence of data on pro se cases after
the enactment of the PLRA is critical because the PLRA potentially
affected the majority of pro se cases by curtailing prisoner litigation
and litigants seeking to waive the filing fee.31 Although the PLRA is
rather complex, the six most relevant provisions affecting pro se
litigation are:
1. Inmates and detainees are the only group of individuals who are
required to pay the $150 filing fee, regardless of the outcome of
their case or whether they have sufficient funds in their prison
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b);3 2
2. Regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid, there is now a
mandatory dismissal of actions "if the court determines that ... (B)
the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2);33
3. Inmates and detainees are prohibited from filing actions without
the filing fee if they have three or more actions already dismissed as
frivolous or malicious. They are also prohibited from filing actions
without the filing fee if they fail to state a claim, unless there is a
showing that the inmate or detainee is in imminent danger or
serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);34
4. Inmates and detainees must now exhaust their administrative
remedies prior to filing an action challenging their prison
conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);35
Munger, supra note 7, at 1813 (stating that "until recently, statistical or broad
information about all pro se cases was limited at best.").
31. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994).
32. Upheld in Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2001).
33. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir.
2000) ("[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the
plaintiff has paid the required filing fee .... ).
34. Upheld in Snidel v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1999); Wilson v.
Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1998); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723-29
(11th Cir. 1998); see also Welch v. Galie, 207 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that a lawsuit dismissed prior to enactment of PLRA may be counted as previously
dismissed frivolous action for purposes of barring inmate from future filings under
this provision).
35. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
731-32 (2001) (holding that the PLRA requires exhaustion even where the grievance
process does not permit award of monetary damages and prisoner seeks only
20021
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5. Inmates are no longer entitled to damages for mental anguish. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e); 36 and
6. Courts are limited in their ability to enter consent decrees
("prospective relief") unless the court finds: 1) the violation
involves a federal right; and 2) the relief is narrowly drawn and
least intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right. 18
U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2).37
While the PLRA was broadly designed and intended to have a
profound effect on prisoner and pro se litigation,38 its exact effects
have not been documented. There are no studies reviewing actual
pro se cases in federal court since the enactment of the PLRA on
April 24, 1996.
There are three contemporary studies on pro se litigation, however,
that are worth reviewing. The first is the 1993 study of 227 cases from
the Northern District of California in San Francisco mentioned
above.39 While informative, this study does not include pro se cases
filed by prisoners. Therefore, the analysis of pro se cases gives an
inaccurate depiction of the current status of pro se cases because
prisoners file more pro se cases than any other group of plaintiffs.4"
Furthermore, the study was confined to cases filed prior to the
enactment of the PLRA and during only one year, 1993.4"
monetary damages).
36. Upheld in Davis v. D.C., 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Ford v.
McGinnis, No. 00 Civ. 3437, 2000 WL 1808729, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000);
Wright v. Miller, 973 F. Supp. 390, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Harris v. Lord, 957 F. Supp.
471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28-29 (2d Cir.
1999).
37. Upheld in Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1999).
38. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7524, S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole) ("If enacted, [the PLRA] ... would go a long way to curtail frivolous
prisoner litigation."); id. at S7526 (statement of Sen. Kyl):
[The PLRA] will deter frivolous inmate lawsuits .... Legislation is needed
because of the large and growing number of prisoner civil rights complaints,
the burden that disposing of meritless complaints imposes on efficientjudicial administration, and the need to discourage prisoners from filing
frivolous complaints as a means of gaining a "short sabbatical in the nearest
Federal courthouse."
(quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted)); id. at S14611-01, S14626-27 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (stating that the PLRA "will help bring relief to a civil justice system
overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits.... The crushing burden of these
frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider meritorious claims.").
39. Park, supra note 20, at 821.
40. For example, just over 60% of the 10,614 pro se cases filed in the Southern
District of New York from 1995-1999 were filed by prisoners.
41. The study's findings, which included pro se plaintiffs and defendants, also
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In Search of Meritorious Claims: A Study of the Processing of
Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in a Federal District Court,4 2 is the second
relevant study. That study sets forth an informative and systematic
statistical breakdown of prisoner civil rights cases filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona. The study, however,
was performed during only one year, 1994, and prior to the enactment
of the PLRA. Furthermore, the study examined only prisoner civil
rights cases and included cases where the prisoner had legal
representation.43
Finally, in 1998, Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation," was
published focusing on state court pro se litigation. The study
provided a thorough explanation of the current status of pro se
litigation in state court by conducting a survey of 612 state court
judges,45 and 237 state court administrators.46 The survey covered a
variety of subjects and centered on the perspectives, experiences, and
opinions of judges and administrators in working with pro se cases. It
did not examine actual cases or provide any raw statistical data with
which to compare the judges' and administrators' opinions. Thus,
while the study provided insight into the current perception of pro se
cases, it did not provide an actual accounting of pro se cases.
In addition to the lack of legal scholarship examining pro se
litigation, there is also no government organization that documents
pro se litigation in the federal district courts. 7 The Administrative
sharply contrasted with the findings of this Study in several areas. For example, the
1993 study found that pro se litigants applied for in forma pauperis (waiver of the
filing fee) status in only 30% of the cases. Id. at 830. The instant study finds that
number to be closer to 95%. See infra Tbls. IV & V. Similarly, the 1993 study found
that 27.3% of the cases included a government entity, see Park, supra note 20, at 823,
while the instant Study again found that number to be significantly higher, at 79.1%.
See infra Tbl. II. These discrepancies are likely due to the absence of prisoner filings
in the 1993 study.
42. Henry F. Fradella, In Search of Meritorious Claims: A Study of the Processing
of Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in a Federal District Court, 21 JUST. Sys. J. 23, 28
(1999).
43. Id.
44. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2.
45. 133 of the 612 judges responded to the survey. Id.
46. 98 of the 237 administrators responded to the survey. Id.
47. While individual pro se offices, like the one in the Southern District of New
York, may record their own data, the data is limited to general filings and is not
readily available to other districts. In addition, the 1999 Annual Report to Congress
on the Optimal Utilization of Judicial Resources did not once mention pro se
litigation or the burdens it has on the courts. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES 1-23
(1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/publications.html.
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Office of the United States Courts, the federal governmental body
that maintains and reports the number and type of cases filed each
year,48 does not publish data on whether a party files pro se, in which
cases, and the burdens pro se litigation presents to the court. 9 The
only "official" numbers I was able to find pertaining to pro se
litigation were general statistics kept by the Southern District of New
York's Pro Se Office. Those numbers consisted solely of the number
and category of cases that were filed pro se.
In sum, the existing data failed to provide a sufficient and accurate
picture of pro se litigation in the federal district courts. There was
neither a contemporary study examining pro se litigation in federal
district courts following the enactment of the PLRA, nor a study that
included both prisoner and non-prisoner litigation.
B. Procedures Used to Conduct the Study
This Study was designed to respond to the absence of data on
federal pro se cases. Specifically, the Study presents previously
unavailable data by examining the actual filing and processing of pro
se cases in a useful way to present recommendations creatively. The
Study begins by asking three questions. First, what information
would be most beneficial in identifying who files pro se and what type
of case she files? Second, how do pro se filings proceed and how are
they resolved in the federal district court? Third, what burdens do
pro se cases present to the courts?
1. Initial Case Selection
The selection of cases for this Study was shaped by the lack of
existing data examining pro se cases filed after the enactment of the
PLRA. As stated above, there is currently no study examining
federal pro se cases after the enactment of the PLRA.5 In order to
fill this gap, cases were selected from 1997, one year after April 26,
1996, the date the PLRA was enacted. Next, the Study was expanded
to cover several years to include at least one full year before the 1995
enactment of the PLRA, in order to provide a comparison and review
of the effects of the PLRA. Finally, because a specific category of
cases may drastically increase or decrease based on new legislation
48. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS, app. tbls. C-3 & D-3 (2001).
49. Id.
50. See supra text accompanying note 30.
2002] IMPROVING PRO SE CASES 317
and case law,51 the Study was expanded to predict future filings of pro
se cases more accurately and to compensate for any irregularities
presented by new legislation (1995-1999). Unlike any previous study,
the results of this Study include cases filed before and after the
enactment of the PLRA, and span several years.
Once the years for this Study were chosen, the categories of cases
selected for the Study were slightly narrowed. The three limitations
were the exclusion of habeas corpus petitions,52 bankruptcy petitions,
and cases where the defendant was proceeding pro se. Habeas corpus
petitions were eliminated from the Study due to the hybrid nature of
habeas corpus petitions between criminal and civil,53 the unique civil
procedure rules that dictate habeas corpus petitions,54 and the unique
remedy available in habeas corpus petitions (i.e., release from
custody).5 Similarly, due to the unique nature of bankruptcy
petitions and the status of the district court petition as an appeal from
the bankruptcy court, bankruptcy petitions were excluded.
The following is a graph of the total number of civil cases, pro se
cases, and non-habeas pro se cases filed in the Southern District of
New York between 1995 and 1999.
TOTAL CIVIL CASES
Total Non Habeas
1 Civil Pro Se Cases Pro Se Cases
Cases Filed
2 1995 10,273 2,256 1,843
3 1996 10,542 2,293 1,735
4 1997 10,271 2,251 1,379
5 1998 9,870 1,765 1,270
6 1999 13,773 2,049 1,434
7 TOTAL (% OFTOTAL) 54,729 10,614 (19.4%) 7,661 (14%)
As seen in the seventh row of the above graph, non-habeas corpus
pro se civil cases amounted to 7,661 cases from 1995-1999.
51. See, e.g., infra Tbls. I & II and accompanying text (indicating a significant
decrease in prisoner filings after the enactment of the PLRA).
52. Habeas corpus petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254-2255 (2002), were
excluded from the Study.
53. While habeas corpus petitions generally challenge state and federal criminal
convictions, they are processed as civil cases and assigned a civil docket number.
54. Habeas corpus petitions filed pursuant to §§ 2254 and 2255 have separate
rules of civil procedure. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-2255 (setting forth rules governing
habeas corpus cases and rules on motion attacking sentence).
55. See id.
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Approximately 10% of these cases (765) were selected for the study
by collecting every tenth case in the order in which it was filed.56
2. Data Calculated
Once the cases were selected, the question became: what
information should be extracted from each case? Starting with the
court file, each document was reviewed and recorded including:
1. Case Categories;
2. General information on the parties;
3. In forma pauperis application filed;57
4. Type of remedy sought;
5. Documents filed with the court;
6. Filing and disposition of request for counsel;
58
7. Final disposition of the case; and
8. Reason for dismissal.
The above information was then cross-referenced with the court's
docket sheet. In addition, the following information was extracted
from the docket sheet:
9. Appeals; and
10. Prior case filings in the court.
Next, data from the court files and docket sheets was gathered in
an attempt to calculate the length and burden of pro se cases, and
which cases are the most burdensome. In addition, the Pro Se
Office's records detailing mailed correspondences with litigants were
reviewed to record how often the Pro Se Office corresponded with
each litigant. The following data was collected:
11(a) Number of days the case was pending with the court;59
56. Ten percent of the cases provided a sufficiently large sample to maintain an
adequate level of reliability for the individual pieces of data collected. As the "rate
of occurrence" (the frequency within which an event occurs) varied among the
different data collected, so too did the reliability and "confidence level." By choosing
10% of the cases, the study yielded an approximate chance of error from 1-4%, and a
"confidence level" of 95-99%, depending on the piece of data collected. See
COLLECTING AND ANALYZING COURT STATISTICS: A HANDBOOK PREPARED FOR THE
NEW HAMPSHIRE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL COURTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROJECT 23-26, Tbls. A-H (1977).
57. An in forma pauperis application is a request to the court to waive the $150
filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (setting civil action fee rate at $150); 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(stating that filing fee may be waived upon affidavit stating that plaintiff is unable to
pay such fees).
58. Appointment of counsel in civil cases is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 391 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
59. The number of days was calculated from the date the complaint was received
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11(b) Number of docket entries in each case; and
11(c) Number of communications each litigant had with Pro Se
Office.
Unlike any previous research done on pro se litigation, the instant
research examined pro se litigation from the initial pleadings through
the court proceedings and concluded with the appeals.
C. The Raw Results"
The raw data is reported in an Appendix, and is analyzed and
reorganized in a usable fashion in the following section. The data in
the Appendix is laid out in the order it was recorded, and is separated
by groupings that correspond to the numbers and subjects listed
above (i.e., Case Categories, In Forma Pauperis Application, etc.).
Within each grouping the data is reported in five separate graphs per
grouping. Each graph contains the data collected from one of the five
years covered in the study (1995-1999). Finally, each graph in the
Appendix is structured with the category of case (i.e., civil rights,
employment discrimination, social security, etc.) across the top and
information specific to that grouping along the left side.
II. READING THE DATA
How can the raw data be constructively interpreted to shed light on
pro se litigation? The following three Sections address this question
in three separate areas: 1) Characteristics of Pro Se Complaints; 2)
Processing and Resolving of Pro Se Litigation; and 3) Burdens that
Pro Se Cases Have on the Court. A fourth Section summarizes the
three prior sections in search of patterns or other predictable
challenges presented by pro se litigation to present possible
prototypical pro se cases. The analysis' emphasis is on isolating the
most problematic issues that pro se litigants and the court encounter.
A. Characteristics of Pro Se Complaints
The following four sub-sections analyze the data pertaining to pro
by the Court's Pro Se Office until the date it was closed.
60. As the Study is confined solely to the Southern District of New York, the
results may not be applicable to all United States District Courts. The Study may,
however, serve as a model for other district courts to perform similar and expanded
studies and devise appropriate responses. It should also be noted that because this is
a manually performed statistical study, there are possibilities of error. These
possibilities were considered and an attempt to control them was made.
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se complaints.6 The four sub-sections, 1) Case Category; 2) Parties
Involved; 3) Characteristics of the In Forma Pauperis Application;
and 4) Type of Remedy Sought, are particularly informative not only
because the complaint is the first official communication between the
litigant and the court, but also because it initiates the lawsuit, and is
often the only document the court reviews prior to dismissal.62
1. Case Categories63
The most common complaint selected for the Study was a civil
rights action.6 As seen in the seventh row of Table I, civil rights
actions amounted to 59% (451 of 765) of the cases selected. The next
two most frequently selected actions were employment discrimination
(18%) and social security (12%) cases. Combined, these three
categories of cases amount to 89% of the pro se cases selected for the
Study (680 of 765).
TABLE I
MAJOR CASE CATEGORIES
Civil Employ. Discrim. Social Security Inmat%51Rights Plaintiff
2 1995 (% of cases by year) 123(67%) 36(20%) 9(5%) 122(67%)
3 1996 (% of cases by year) 109(63%) 28(16%) 19(11%) 101 (57%)
4 1997 (% of cases by year) 71(51%) 28(20%) 24(17%) 61(44%)
5 1998 (% of cases by year) 62(49%) 21 (17%) 27(21%) 56(44%)
6 1999 (% of cases by year) 86(60%) 23(16%) 14(10%) 68(48%)
TOTALS
7 (% OFTOTALCASESSTUDIED) 451 (59%) 136 (18%) 93 (12%) 408 (53.1%)
61. The four sub-sections correspond to the data reported in the first four
groupings of graphs in the Appendix. See infra App. §§ 1-4.
62. For a discussion on sua sponte dismissals based solely on allegations in the
complaint, see infra note 82.
63. For the raw data corresponding to this section, see infra App. § 1.
64. For purposes of this Article, "civil rights" actions refer to those cases filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, & 1985 (2002), and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the federal analogy
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 498-99 (1978); Barbera v.
Smith, 654 F. Supp. 386, 390 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
65. Although inmate-filed cases are not a subject matter such as civil rights or
employment discrimination, they are included as a separate category throughout the
Study because they are so prevalent. Thus, each inmate-filed case is accounted for
twice: once under the inmate-filed case category, and once under the subject matter
of the case.
IMPROVING PRO SE CASES
As seen in Table I, while civil rights cases remained the most
frequently selected cases throughout the Study, they also experienced
the largest decrease in cases filed. As seen in the second row of Table
I, in 1995, the last full year prior to the enactment of the PLRA, civil
rights cases equaled 67% (123 of 184) of the cases selected. Two
years later, in 1997, the first full year after the enactment of the
PLRA, civil rights cases dropped to 51% of the cases (fourth row),
and to 49% in 1998 (fifth row). Although in 1999 civil rights cases
regained some ground, increasing to 60% of the cases selected (sixth
row), the decrease in cases during 1997 and 1998 is most likely due to
the implementation of the PLRA and its restrictions on pro se cases.66
While civil rights cases experienced the largest decrease in cases
filed, cases challenging social security benefits experienced the largest
increase. While comprising only 5% of the cases selected in 1995
(second row), social security cases rose to 17% in 1997 (fourth row),
and 21% in 1998 (fifth row), before dipping to 10% in 1999 (sixth
row).67 The only other category of cases that consistently amounted
to at least 5% of the cases selected for the Study was employment
discrimination cases. Over the course of the Study, employment
discrimination cases experienced only small fluctuations, amounting
to 16-20% of the cases studied per year.
Other categories of cases that had more than one case filed and are
discussed throughout the Study are cases concerning: labor (ten
cases); diversity (eight cases); housing (six cases); Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") (four cases); and family law (three
cases). The remaining fifty-four cases are categorized under an
"others" category.
2. Parties68
The data from this sub-section examines what, if any, common
characteristics exist among the parties to a pro se lawsuit. The Study
66. The Study's findings that civil rights cases decreased from 1995 to 1998, and
then increased in 1999, accurately reflect the number of civil rights cases filed in the
entire pro se caseload, during those years. In 1995 civil rights cases made up 56% of
the caseload compared to 48% in 1996; 37% in 1997; 38% in 1998; and 42% in 1999.
General data on pro se cases collected by the Pro Se Office for the years 1995-1999
(on file with Pro Se Office).
67. These numbers accurately reflect the rise in social security cases in the entire
pro se caseload-3% in 1995; 7% in 1996; 10% in 1997; 16% in 1998; 9% in 1999.
General data on pro se cases was collected by the Pro Se Office for the years 1995-
1999 (on file with Pro Se Office).
68. For the raw data corresponding to this section, see infra App. § 2.
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revealed that the three most defining party characteristics are: 1) an
inmate as a plaintiff; 2) more than one defendant named in the
complaint; and 3) at least one government individual or agency
named as a defendant. First, as seen in the fifth column in Table II,
inmates filed over 53% (408 of 765) of the pro se cases selected for
the Study. As seen in the second row of column five, in exclusively
civil rights actions, the percentage of cases filed by inmates rose to
87.6% (395 of 451). Thus, out of 408 inmate-filed cases, 395 (96.8%)
were civil rights actions; or, in other words, inmates filed a non-civil
rights action in only 13 of the 408 (3.2%) cases they filed.69
The number of inmate-filed cases sharply decreased following the
enactment of the PLRA. One full year prior to the enactment of the
PLRA, inmate-filed cases decreased from 67% in 1995 (second row),
to 44% in 1997 (fourth row), as shown in Table I. Although inmate-
filed cases increased to 48% in 1999 (sixth row), they are not near the
level they were in 1995. The latter trend exhibits the profound effect
the PLRA has had on pro se litigation.
As seen in the eleventh row of Table II, in 80.9% of the cases filed
by inmates, the inmate named multiple defendants (330 of 408).
Furthermore, over 60% of the pro se plaintiffs overall filed against
multiple defendants (twelfth row), including one in every three
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases (third row).7" The
Study did not conclusively show, however, that a plaintiff in a specific
type of case was more likely to name more multiple defendants per
complaint than in another type of case. For example, plaintiffs filing
civil rights actions with multiple defendants averaged 5, 4.8, 4.9, 7.9,
and 8 defendants per complaint from 1995 through 1999, respectively,
while employment discrimination complaints averaged 4, 6.2, 3.7, 2.8,
and 7.7 defendants per complaint, respectively, over the same
period.1
TABLE II
PARTIES BY CASE TYPE
Multiple TOTALMultiple Plaintiffs t Gov't Defendant Inmate Plaintiff CASES(% of case type) (% of case type) (% of case type) (% of case type) BY
TYPE
69. The Study did not contain an employment discrimination case filed by an
inmate.
70. Only 2.6% of pro se cases surveyed filed with multiple plaintiffs.
71. See infra App. § 2.
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2 Civil Rights 9(2%) 370(82%) 417(92.4%) 395 (87.6%) 451
3 Employ.
Discrim. 3(2%) 45 (33.1%) 52 (38.2%) 0(0%) 136
4 Social
Security 1 (1.1%) 8(8.6%) 93(100%) 2(.5%) 93
5 Diversity 1(2%) 3(37.5%) 1 (12.5%) 1 (.2%) 8
6 FOIA 1(25%) 3(75%) 4(100%) 2(.5%) 4
7 Housing 1(16.7%) 5(83.3%) 2(33.3%) 0(0%) 6
8 Family 1(33.3%) 2(66.7%) 1(33.3%) 0(0%) 3
9 Labor 2 (20%) 8 (80%) 3(30%) 0(0%) 10
10 Others 3(3.7%) 25(46.3%) 33(61.1%) 8(2%) 54
11 Inmate
Plaintiff 9(2.2%) 330(80.9%) 377 (92.1%) 408 (100%) 408
12 TOTALS
r_2 (% OF CASES) 20(2.6%) 469(61.2%) 606(79.1%) 408(53.3%) 765
Government defendants were common in pro se cases. Almost
four out of every five pro se cases were filed against at least one
government defendant. While it was not surprising that 92.4% of the
civil rights cases and 100% of the social security cases were filed
against a government defendant (second and fourth rows),72 over one
in three employment discrimination cases (38.2%) were filed against
a government defendant, as seen in the third row of Table II.
In sum, and as seen in the second and eleventh row of Table II,
inmates were most likely to file civil rights actions (87.6%), and to file
against multiple defendants (80.9%), at least one government
defendant (92.4%). 7' Based on the numbers in Table II, it is not
surprising that pro se cases filed by an inmate and/or against multiple
defendants and/or a government defendant, fluctuated with
72. Courts require that a defendant in a civil rights action commit the alleged
constitutional deprivation as a state actor. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (requiring that defendant in civil rights action commit
the alleged constitutional deprivation as a state actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988) (stating that alleged deprivation must be "committed by a person acting under
color of state law."); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)
(requiring that defendant in civil rights action commit the alleged constitutional
deprivation as a state actor).
73. While the number of total civil rights claims dropped after the enactment of
the PLRA (from 1017 in 1995, to 602 in 1999), so too did the percentage of inmate
filings within civil rights claims. In 1995 inmates filed 95% of the civil rights cases
surveyed, and 66% of the total cases surveyed. Those numbers dropped to 79% and
47% in 1999. General data on pro se cases collected by the Pro Se Office for the
years 1995-1999 (on file with Pro Se Office).
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approximately the same regularity from year to year. As seen in
Table III, the number of inmate plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and
government defendants decreased from 1995 to 1998, and then rose in
1999.
TABLE III
..... PARTIES BY YEAR
Multiple Government Inmate Plaintiff
Defendants Defendant
2 1995 124 151 122
3 1996 115 134 101
4 1997 75 110 61
5 1998 66 102 56
6 1999 89 109 68
7 TOTALS 469(61.2%) 606(79.1%) 408(53.1%)
(% OF CASES)
Other highlights involving the parties to a pro se lawsuit were:
" Social security plaintiffs rarely filed against multiple defendants
(8.6%) (see Table II, row four).
" Diversity cases were filed against multiple defendants in only a
little over one-third of the cases (see Table II, row five).
" Housing cases were filed against government officials in only one-
third of the cases (see Table II, row seven).
3. In Forma Pauperis Application74
Although not part of the complaint, the payment of the filing fee is
a prerequisite to initiating an action in the court. The in forma
pauperis application is the method in which a litigant requests waiver
of the $150 filing fee based on indigence. The results of the Study
revealed that regardless of the year or category of case, pro se
plaintiffs almost unanimously filed an in forma pauperis application,
and were almost unanimously granted those applications. As seen in
Table IV (setting forth in forma pauperis results by case type) and
Table V (setting forth in forma pauperis results by year), pro se
plaintiffs filed an in forma pauperis application in 94.9% of the cases
(twelfth row in Table IV and seventh row in Table V), with
percentages varying from 87.5% to 100% depending on the category
74. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 3.
2002] IMPROVING PRO SE CASES 325
of case and year. In forma pauperis applications were granted 99.4%
of the time (twelfth row in Table IV and seventh row in Table V),
including 440 of the 441 applications filed in civil rights cases, and all
of the applications filed by inmates. Only four of the 726 applications
were denied. The denied applications were: one in a civil rights
action, two in employment discrimination actions, and one in a
diversity action.
TABLE IV
IN FORMA PAuPERIS BY CASE TYPEF
1 In Forma Pauperis request Granted Denied
made (% of case type) (% of applications) (% of applications)
2 Civil Rights 441 (97.8%) 440 (99.8%) 1 (0.2%)
3 Employ.
Discrim. 120(88.2%) 118(98.3%) 2(1.7%)
4 Social 89(95.7%) 89(100%) 0(0%)
Security
5 Housing 6 (100%) 6 (100%) 0(0%)
6 Family 3(100%) 3(100%) 0(0%)
7 Diversity 7(87.5%) 6(85.7%) 1(14.3%)
8 FOIA 4(100%) 4(100%) 0(0%)
9 Labor 9(90%) 9(100%) 0(0%)
10 Others 47(87%) 47(100%) 0(0%)
11 Inmate 444(98.4%) 444(100%) 0 (0%)
Filing
12 TOTALS 726 (94.9%) 722 (99.4%) 4(0.6%)
TABIF V
IN FoRMA PALPLIS BY YEAR
I In Forma Pauperis Granted Denied
request made
(% of yearly cases) (% of applications) (% of applications)
2 1995 176(95.6%) 174(98.9%) 2(1.1%)
3 1996 166(95.4%) 166(100%) 0(0%)
4 1997 131 (94.9%) 131 (100%) 0(0%)
5 1998 121 (96%) 121 (100%) 0(0%)
6 1999 132(92.3%) 130(98.5%) 2(1.5%)
7 TOTALS 726 (94.9%) 722 (99.4%) 4(0.6%)
While the PLRA was likely responsible for the decrease in the
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number of cases filed by inmates,75 the results of the Study indicate
that the PLRA did not affect whether an inmate chose to file an in
forma pauperis application. As stated above, pursuant to the PLRA,
inmates must now pay the filing fee regardless of their ability to do
SO.7 6 Despite this change, the rate inmates filed in forma pauperis
applications did not change after the enactment of the PLRA.
Approximately 95% of inmates filed an in forma pauperis application
before and after the PLRA (see rows two and four of column two).
Similarly, approximately 99% of the applications were granted both
before and after the PLRA (compare rows two with four, five and six
of column three). Thus, once an inmate decided to file a complaint in
the district court, the PLRA had no effect on whether the inmate
chose to file an in forma pauperis application, or on the merits of that
application.
4. Type of Remedy Sought7
Based on the results of the Study, pro se plaintiffs almost always
requested some form of monetary relief. As seen in the second and
third rows of Table VI, plaintiffs requested solely monetary relief in
69.3% of the cases, and solely equitable relief in only 3.5% of the
cases. When factoring in that 27.2% of plaintiffs requested both
monetary and equitable relief (fourth row), the total number of
plaintiffs requesting some monetary relief increases to 96.5 %, as seen
in the sixth row.
TABLE VI
TOTALS RELIEF REQUESTED
I ALL CASES Civil Employ. Social InmatesRights Discrim. Security
530 286 109 92 2612 Monetary Only (69.3%) (63.4%) (80.1%) (98.9%) (64%)
27 10 1 13
3 Equitable Only (3.5%) (2.2%) (.7%) (3.2%)
4 Both Monetary and 208 155 26 1 134
Equitable (27.2%) (34.4%) (19.1%) (1.1%) (32.8%)
5
738 441 135 93 395Some Monetary (96.5%) (97.8%) (99.3%) (100%) (96.8%)
Se'e supra Tbl. I and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
For the raw data corresponding to this section, see infra App. § 4.
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235 165 1 1477 Some Equitable (30.7%) (36.6%) 27 (19.9%) (1.1%) (36%)
8 TOTAL CASES FILED 765 451 136 93 408
Although the percentage of monetary and equitable relief did not
greatly fluctuate among the different case types, there were some
fluctuations. First, while 69.3% of all the plaintiffs requested
exclusively monetary relief (second row of Table VI), that number
jumped to 98.9% (second row of Table VI) for plaintiffs requesting
exclusively monetary relief in social security cases. The propensity of
pro se litigants to request monetary relief in social security cases is
likely due to the fact that the underlying issue in most social security
cases is the denial of monetary benefits, and the nature of the suit is,
therefore, to receive those benefits.
Other fluctuations included:
" Plaintiffs in the civil rights cases were almost twice as likely as other
plaintiffs to take a broader approach to requesting relief by seeking
both monetary and equitable relief in 34.4% of the cases (fourth
row of Table VI), compared to 16.9% in all other cases. The
number 16.9% is derived from subtracting the number of civil rights
cases getting both monetary and equitable relief (155) from the
total number of cases getting both monetary and equitable relief
(208), and taking the percentage of that number.
* Only one plaintiff in 136 employment discrimination cases sought
solely equitable relief and only 19.8% of the plaintiffs asked for any
equitable relief. (third and fourth rows of Table VI) Thus, less than
one in five employment discrimination plaintiffs sought any
injunctive relief, such as reemployment, raise, or promotion.
* Over one-third of inmates (36%) sought some equitable relief.
(seventh row of Table VI).
Some of the smaller samples of cases selected also showed some
trends:
* All eight plaintiffs in diversity cases sought exclusively monetary
relief.
" All three plaintiffs in family cases sought some form of equitable
relief.
* While some plaintiffs in labor cases requested equitable relief, all
the plaintiffs requested some monetary relief.
Finally, in 1995, one year prior to the PLRA, 13 plaintiffs sought
solely equitable relief (7.1%).7' During the three years following the
78. See infra App. § 4.
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PLRA (1997-1999), only twelve plaintiffs sought solely equitable
relief (2.9%)."9 It is possible that the decrease in plaintiffs requesting
equitable relief is due to the provisions in the PLRA, such as
requiring exhaustion of remedies for conditions of confinement
claims, which involve and/or resolve equitable relief claims.
B. Processing and Resolving Pro Se Litigation
The following five sub-sections analyze the data pertaining to how
pro se cases proceed through the court. The five sub-sections" are:
1. Court filings post-complaint;
2. Processing of requests for counsel;
3. Final disposition of pro se cases;
4. Reason for dismissal of pro se cases; and
5. Processing of pro se appeals.
1. Court Filings Post-Complaint81
The court filings submitted after the complaint was filed varied
widely depending on the category of the case and at what stage the
case was closed. While cases dismissed sua sponte82 consistently
79. See infra App. § 4.
80. See infra App. §§ 5-9.
81. For the raw data corresponding to this section, see infra App. § 5.
82. Sua sponte dismissals are made "[w]ithout prompting or suggestion" and "on
[the court's] own motion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (7th ed. 1999). Each pro
se complaint, whether fee-paid or not, that enters the Southern District of New York
is substantively screened and, if appropriate, dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A (2000) & 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2000) solely on the allegations
set forth in the complaint. The relevant provisions from these three statutes are:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2):
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal -
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A:
(a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
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2002] IMPROVING PRO SE CASES
contained the same filed documents,83 once a case proceeded beyond
a sua sponte review, the filed documents became much more diverse.
The five most common filings submitted after the complaint was filed,
as listed in Table VII, were: 1) a motion to dismiss (194 cases);' 2) a
discovery motion or request (176 cases); 3) an extension of time (172
cases); 4) an amended complaint (145 cases); and 5) a sixty-day order
directing the litigant to provide the court with additional information
(116 cases).8 As seen in the second row of Table VII, 340 cases were
not dismissed sua sponte.86 Most, if not all, of the motions to dismiss
and discovery motions were filed in these 340 cases.
complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c):
(c) Dismissal -
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party
dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is
satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the court may
dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
83. Court files in sua sponte dismissed cases generally consisted of the complaint,
in forma pauperis application, cover sheet, summons, and order of dismissal.
84. Defendants seeking to dismiss pro se complaints pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rules 12(b) & 56 filed almost all of these motions.
85. Other frequently filed documents included: a motion for reconsideration
(thirty-two cases); an order to show cause (twenty-eight cases); and a motion for
default judgment (sixteen cases).
86. See infra Part II.B.3 (showing the complete results on the final resolution of
the cases); see also supra note 82 (describing sua sponte dismissals).
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TABLE VII
SELEC D FILINGS IN PRO SE CASES
1 ALL CASES Civil Rights Employ. Social InmateDiscrim. Security Filing
2 Cases Not Dismissed Sua 340 (44.4%) 139 (30.8%) 100 (73.5%) 74 (79.6%) 138 (33.8%)
Sponte
Motion to Dismiss 194 (25.4%) 76 (16.9%) 61 (44.9%) 42 (45.2%) 70 (17.2%)
3 (% of cases)1
4 Discovery Motions 176 (23%) 92 (20.4%) 59 (43.4%) 13 (14%) 87 (21.3%)
5 Extension of Time 172 (22.5%) 63 (14%) 28 (20.6%) 72 (77.4%) 59 (14.5%)
6 Amended Complaint 145 (19%) 87 (19.3%) 37 (27.2%) 9 (9.7%) 78 (19.1%)
7 60-Day Order 116 (15.2%) 73 (16.2%) 15 (11%) 17 (18.3%) 62 (15.2%)
8 TOTAL CASES 765 451 136 93 408
One of the most time consuming motions to adjudicate, the motion
to dismiss, was the one most often filed. As seen in the third row of
Table VII, a motion to dismiss was filed in over one-quarter of all the
cases reviewed, and in roughly three-fifths of the cases that survived a
sua sponte review. Whether a motion to dismiss was filed varied
significantly depending on the type of case. Pro se social security
cases (motions to dismiss were filed in 45.2%), and employment
discrimination cases (motions to dismiss were filed in 44.9%) were
roughly twice as likely to have a motion to dismiss filed, than civil
rights cases (motions to dismiss were filed in 16.9%). The disparity
among the category of cases in which a motion to dismiss was filed is
due to the higher rate of sua sponte dismissals in civil rights actions
than in the other cases.87 In sua sponte dismissed actions, a motion to
dismiss is unnecessary because the case has already been terminated
on the court's own motion. While a motion to dismiss is least likely to
be filed in civil rights cases, the number of motions to dismiss per civil
rights case, once it proceeded beyond a sua sponte review, was often
higher than other cases. As seen in the third row of Table VII, a
motion to dismiss was filed in 76 of the civil rights cases. However, of
the 451 civil rights cases, 312 were dismissed sua sponte.88 Thus, a
motion to dismiss was filed in 54.7% of the 139 civil rights cases that
survived a sua sponte review.
87. See infra Tbl. XII (finding that 69% of the civil rights cases were dismissed sua
sponte, while only 26.5% of the employment discrimination cases, and 20.4% of
social security cases were dismissed sua sponte).
88. See infra Tbl. XII.
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The next most common filing was a discovery motion. The filings
of discovery motions mirrored that of motions to dismiss, with one
significant exception. As seen in the third and fourth rows of Table
VII, while motions to dismiss were filed most often in social security
cases (45.2%), discovery motions were filed the least often in social
security cases (14%). One explanation for this disparity is that social
security cases are either resolved on a motion to dismiss, or upon a
settlement (often to remand to the Social Security Administration)
after sua sponte review, but prior to discovery.89
While an extension of time was filed in almost one-fourth of the
total cases studied, an extension of time was filed in social security
cases 77.4% of the time, as seen in the fifth row of Table VII. The
number of extensions of time filed in social security cases amounts to
the filing of an extension in one in every 1.29 social security
complaints, compared to one in every seven civil rights complaints.
The government filed the majority of the extensions of time in social
security cases after service was effected. It was also common to find
that the government was granted two or three extensions of time in
each social security case.
The final two most common filings, as set forth in rows six and
seven of Table VII, are amended complaints and sixty-day orders.
Sixty-day orders, which often direct the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint, were issued in 15.2% of the complaints selected for the
Study. Thus, almost one out of every seven pro se complaints
reviewed was filed with insufficient information. Since most sixty-day
orders direct the plaintiff to file an amended complaint, the
percentage of cases in which an amended complaint was filed was
logically higher than that of the sixty-day orders (19%). There were a
few deviations, however, that require more investigation.
Employment discrimination cases experienced the lowest sixty-day
order rate (11%), yet they had the highest amended complaint rate
(27.2%). Therefore, while the court may not request additional
information, litigants in employment discrimination cases,
nonetheless, supplemented or altered their original complaints. This
raises a number of questions. Does this mean that the form
complaints used for employment discrimination cases are inadequate
in terms of allowing the litigant to voice her concerns? Does it mean
that a pro se plaintiff in an employment discrimination case is more
89. Based upon personal experience, I have found that pro se litigants in
employment discrimination cases most often ask questions relating to the discovery
process.
2002]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
likely to obtain counsel, who then files an amended complaint on her
own volition, and not upon the direction of a sixty-day order? Does it
mean that additional claims, such as retaliation, arise more often in
employment discrimination cases, and therefore, require an amended
complaint?
Social security cases were somewhat more problematic. They had
one of the highest rates of sixty-day orders (18.3%), but the lowest
rate of amended complaints (9.7%). This, too, raises a number of
questions. Why do plaintiffs in social security cases fail to respond to
the court's sixty-day orders? Are the orders excessively confusing?
Does the litigant need translation assistance or legal assistance in
answering the order?' Are the cases settled before the plaintiff
responds to the sixty-day order?91
2. Processing of Applications for Counsel2
Although there is no constitutional right to have an attorney in a
civil case,93 pro se plaintiffs may make an application to have the court
appoint pro bono counsel.94 In less than one in every four of the cases
surveyed (172 of 765 or 22.5%) pro se plaintiffs made an application
for counsel. As seen in the second row of Table VIII, depending on
the category of case in which the application was filed, the number of
applications for counsel fluctuated from 15.1% to 39.7%. For
example, pro se plaintiffs filed an application for counsel in 15.1% of
the social security cases and 20.8% of the civil rights cases, compared
to 39.7% of the employment discrimination cases. However, as seen
in the third row of Table VIII, when only the cases that survived a sua
sponte review are considered, the percentage of applications filed
drastically changes. Applications for counsel in civil rights cases rose
to 65.5% in cases that survived sua sponte review, surpassing
employment discrimination cases, which rose to 54%. Thus, while
plaintiffs in civil rights cases (and inmate-filed cases) were less likely
overall to file an application for counsel, they were more likely to file
90. Based on my own experience, I have found plaintiffs in social security cases to
have the most difficulties in understanding a court directive, such as a sixty-day order.
91. See infra Tbl. XV (demonstrating that social security cases have one of the
highest rates of dismissal for failure to respond to a sixty-day order).
92. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 6.
93. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27
(1981).
94. See supra note 58 (setting forth the standard for granting application for
counsel).
332
IMPROVING PRO SE CASES
an application once their case survived a sua sponte review. The
Study also revealed that plaintiffs in social security cases were least
likely to file an application for counsel either before or after sua
sponte review. Furthermore, the percentage of applications filed in
social security cases rose slightly in non-sua sponte dismissed cases,
but remained by far the lowest.
TABLE VIII
TOTAL APPLICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
1 All Cases Civil Rights Employ. Social Inmates
Discrim. Security
2 Application Made All 172 of 765 91 of 451 54 of 139 14 of 93 83 of 408
Cases Included (22.5%) (20.8%) (39.7%) (15.1%) (20.3%)
3 Applications Made 172 of 340 91 of 139 54 of 100 14 of 74 83 of 139Excluding Sua Sponte (50.6) (65.5%) (54%) (18.9%) (59.7%)CasesIIII
While the frequency of applications for counsel varied among the
different categories of cases, the rate at which the applications were
granted remained consistent. As seen in the third row of Table IX,
applications for counsel were granted in 21.5% of the cases varying
slightly from 18.5% in employment discrimination cases to 28.6% in
social security cases. Thus, while the frequency of filed applications
may have fluctuated by the category of the case, the likelihood that
the application would be granted remained relatively consistent.
TABLE IX
APPLICATIONS GRANTED BY CASE TYPE
1 All Cases Civil Rights Employ. Social InmatesDiscrim. Security
172 91 54 14 83
Applications Filed (22.5%) (20.8%) (39.7%) (15.1%) (20.3%)
3 Applications Granted 37 of 172 21 of 91 10 of 54 4 of 14 21 of 83(21.5%) (23.1%) (18.5%) (28.6%) (25.3%)
4135 of 172 70 of 91 44 of 54 10 of 14 62 of 83Applications Denied (78.5%) (74.7%) (81.5%) (71.4%) (74.7%)
Fifty-four of the 765 cases that were surveyed received some form
of assistance from counsel. This amounted to 15.8% of the cases that
survived a sua sponte review.95 Of these fifty-four, only twenty-four
received assistance from counsel through the court and an application
95. Cases that do not survive a sua sponte review are dismissed after the filing of
the complaint, and therefore, have no legal representation.
2002]
334 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
for counsel (twenty-four of 172 applications filed or 14%). Thus, as
seen in the third row of Table X, of the thirty-seven applications
granted, twenty-four actually received representation through the
application process.96 The remaining thirty plaintiffs obtained counsel
on their own (fourth row of Table X).
TABLE X
ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL
1 ALL CASES Civil Rights Employ. Social Inmate Filing
Discrim. Security
2 37 of 172 21 of 91 10 of 54 4 of 14 21 of 83
ApplicationsGranted (21.5%) (23.1%) (18.5%) (28.6%) (25.3%)
3 Counsel Obtained Through 24 of 37 15 of 21 5 of 10 2 of4 13 of 21
Application (64.9%) (71.4%) (50%) (50%) (61.9%)
4 Counsel Obtained on Own 30 3 14 11 4
Plaintiffs in civil rights and inmate-filed cases received assistance of
counsel through the application process much more frequently than
plaintiffs in employment discrimination and social security cases.
Conversely, plaintiffs in employment discrimination and social
security cases obtained counsel without the assistance of the court
much more frequently than plaintiffs in civil rights cases or inmate-
filed cases did. These statistics raise a number of questions. Are the
attorneys who are accepting pro bono cases primarily concerned with
civil rights and prisoner issues, rather than social security and
employment issues? Is the opposite true for attorneys not performing
pro bono representation for the court, but representing pro se
plaintiffs? And why are only 64.9% of the granted applications
receiving counsel?
It is possible to review the effects that the PLRA has had on pro se
litigation from the preceding tables. Table XI sets forth the number
of applications filed per year, and the rate in which they were granted.
As seen in the third row, in 1995, one year prior to the PLRA, 44.4%
(eight of eighteen) of the applications in civil rights cases were
granted. The percentage of applications granted in civil rights cases
decreased to 22% (nine of forty-eight) in the three years following
96. The granting of an application for counsel does not guarantee that counsel
will be assigned. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (setting forth the
procedure for obtaining counsel through the application process in the Southern
District of New York). As of the writing of this article, there were fifty-six
applications granted and awaiting counsel in the Southern District of New York.
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the PLRA (1997-1999). One could conclude that overall the cases
filed after the PLRA have had less merit to warrant granting an
application for counsel, than did those cases filed prior to the PLRA.
If the merits of an application for counsel can be used to partially
gauge the merits of a complaint, than one could argue that the PLRA
has deterred not only frivolous prisoner complaints, but also
meritorious prisoner complaints, or at least complaints that satisfied
the request for counsel standard.97 In other words, if the PLRA
deterred strictly frivolous prisoner litigation, one would assume that
the rate of applications for which counsel are granted would rise, or at
the least remain constant because a higher percentage of the cases
would be meritorious. However, the opposite has occurred. The
percentage of granted/meritorious applications has decreased,
implying that the PLRA has deterred not only frivolous cases, but
also cases with enough merit to warrant the granting of counsel.
TABLE XI
........ . GRANTED APPLICATIONS BY YEAR ___..
1 ALL CASES Civil Rights Employ. Discrim. Social Security Inmate Filing
TOTAL
2 APPLICATIONS 37 of 172 (21.5%) 21 of 91 (23.1%) 10 of 54(18.5%) 4 of 14(28.6%) 21 of 83 (25.3%)
GRANTED
3 1995 11 of 38 (28.9%) 8 of 18 (44.4%) 1 of 14 (7.1%) 0 of2 (0%) 8 of 18 (44.4%)
4 1996 9 of 42 (21.4%) 4 of 25 (16%) 5 of 14 (35.7%) 0 of 1 (0%) 4 of 24 (16.7%)
5 1997 7 of 34 (20.6%) 3 of 14 (21.4%) 2 of 14 (14.3%) 2 of 4 (50%) 3 of 12 (25%)
6 1998 6 of 30 (20%) 3 of 16 (18.8%) 2 of 7 (28.6%) 1 of 5 (20%) 3 of 12 (25%)
7 1999 4 of 28 (14.3%) 3 of 18 (16.7%) 0 of 5 (0%) 1 of 2 (50%) 3 of 17 (17.6%)
3. Final Disposition8
This sub-section looks at the stage in which each case was resolved.
As seen in the top right-hand corner of Table XII, the majority of the
cases reviewed for the Study were terminated pursuant to sua sponte
orders of dismissal (55.6%; 425 of 765). The frequency of sua sponte
dismissals varied widely depending on the category of the case. As
seen in the second row of Table XII, cases classified under "other"
were dismissed sua sponte most often (74.1%), followed by civil rights
97. See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-95 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining
relevant factors in evaluating a request for counsel).
98. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 7.
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cases (69.2%), and then inmate-filed cases (66.2%). 9 There was a
large discrepancy between the frequency with which these cases were
dismissed sua sponte, and the cases that were least likely to be
dismissed sua sponte. Social security and employment discrimination
cases, with sua sponte dismissal rates of 20.4% and 26.5%,
respectively, were between three and four times less likely to be
dismissed sua sponte than civil rights or inmate-filed cases (second
row of Table XII). While more than two-thirds of the civil rights and
inmate-filed actions were dismissed sua sponte, only one-fifth and
one-forth of social security and employment discrimination cases,
respectively, were dismissed sua sponte.
TABLE X1.
TOTALS FINAL DISPOSITION ...
I Civil Right, Employ. Soc, Sec. Hous, Fam. Divers. FOIA Labor Oth, TOTALS InoateDiscri.. Filing
2 Sua Spoote 312 36 19 4 2 5 3 4 40 425 270
Dismissed (69.2%) (26.5%) (20.4%) (66.7%) (66.7%) (62.5%) (75%) (40%) (74.1%) (55.6%) (66.2%)
3 Dismissed on 33 39 28 0 0 1 1 4 4 110 32
MIr/DorS.J. (7.3%) (28.7%) (30.1%) (0%) (0%) (12.5%) (25%) (40%) (7.4%) (14.4%) (7.8%)
4 Voluntary 16 7 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 27 15
Dismissal (3.5%) (5.1%) (1.1%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (20%) (1.9%) (3.5%) (3.7%)
5 ofendant Trial 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3
Verdict (0.7%) (0.7%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0.5%) (0.7%)
6 PlaintiffTrial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Verdict ((1%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) ((0%)
7 Settlement or 35 30 40 0 1 2 0 0 5 113 37
stip. (7.7%) (22.1%) (43%) (0%) (33.3%) (25%) (0%) (0%) (9.3%) (14.8%) (9.1%)
8 Remand to 0 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 0
Agency (0%) (0%) (51.6%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0°/) (0%) (0%) (6.3%) (0%)
9 Stil Pendtng (152 23 5 2 0 0 0 0 4 86 506.7%) (16.9%) (5.4%) (33.3%) (0%) (0%) (0°%) (0%/) (7.4%) (11.2%) (12.3%)
10 TOTALCASES 451 136 93 6 3 8 4 10 54 765 408
Settlements or stipulations were the second most common manner
in which the pro se cases surveyed were resolved, as seen in the
seventh row of Table XII (14.8% of the total cases). Although it was
the second most common disposition of the cases, a settlement or
stipulation was significantly less common than sua sponte dismissals,
which occurred 55.6% of the time. While at an initial glance 14.8%
may appear quite high, it is somewhat misleading. Social security
cases were resolved by settlement 43% of the time, significantly more
than any other type of case. As seen in the seventh and eighth rows
of Table XII, forty of the forty-eight social security cases that settled,
stipulated to a remand to the Social Security Administration for
99. Three of the four cases filed under FOIA were also dismissed sua sponte.
IMPROVING PRO SE CASES
further review or reconsideration. This is not only a common
practice, but also it provides no guarantee that the litigation will not
continue, and that the parties will not reappear before the court at a
later date. A more informative number of settled pro se cases is
10.3%, which is arrived at by subtracting the thirty-eight cases
remanded from both the total cases filed, and the total number of
settled cases, resulting in seventy-five of 727. After social security
cases, the most common cases that were resolved by settlement were
the employment discrimination cases (22.1%),"° while the least likely
to be resolved by settlement were the civil rights cases (7.7%) and
inmate-filed cases (9.1%).
Having counsel greatly improved a litigant's chances of settling her
case. Of the seventy-five cases that settled and did not involve a
social security remand, eighteen (24.7%) had representation at the
time of settlement. This amounted to 43.9% (eighteen of forty-one)
of the counseled cases. Thus, while almost half of the pro se cases
that received assistance of counsel settled, less than one-twelfth of the
non-represented cases settled.
The Study dispelled several myths pertaining to the amount of
money granted to pro se litigants. Not only do pro se plaintiffs rarely
secure any compensation,' but if they do, the amount of
compensation is relatively small, and is generally a fraction of the
litigation costs. Of the seventy-five non-remanded cases that settled,
thirty-one reported the amount of money involved in the settlement.
Of these thirty-one, only two were above $15,000, with most ranging
from $5,000-8,000. 2
As shown in the third row of Table XII, the third most common
resolution of pro se cases surveyed was upon a motion to dismiss or
summary judgment motion.1 3 While the overall average of pro se
cases dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss or summary judgment
was 14.4%, employment discrimination and social security cases were
dismissed at much higher rates of 28.7% and 30.1%, respectively.
This is likely the result of having relatively few employment
discrimination and social security cases dismissed sua sponte, as
100. Diversity and family cases also had high settlement rates. Because only
eleven cases fall within these headings, however, a larger study is warranted.
101. See infra Tbl. XIII (finding that, excluding settlements, not one pro se inmate
plaintiff out of 408 won their case).
102. See infra App. § 7.
103. See supra Tbl. XII (illustrating that the total percentage of cases dismissed on
motion to dismiss or summary judgment is 14.4%).
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shown in the second row of Table XII, and therefore, more cases
reaching the motion to dismiss phase.
Cases that were pending on the court's docket when the Study was
completed were the only other final disposition of the cases that
amounted to more than 10%. As shown in the ninth row of Table
XII, 11.2% of the total cases surveyed were still pending when the
Study was concluded. The highest percentages of cases that remained
on the court's docket were 16.9% of the employment discrimination
cases and 16.7% of the civil rights cases. Furthermore, although only
four cases surveyed from 1995 were still pending, all four were civil
rights cases filed by inmates.
Overall, there were some identifiable characteristics of how pro se
cases were resolved. First, civil rights and inmate-filed cases were
generally dismissed sua sponte at the beginning of the case. Because
there was a high volume of sua sponte dismissals in civil rights and
inmate-filed cases, it is not surprising that relatively few of the cases
were dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss, or on summary
judgment motion, which only arises if the case survives a sua sponte
review. Second, the plurality of employment discrimination cases was
dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment
motion, requiring lengthy motion practice. Although social security
cases had a high rate of dismissal pursuant to motions to dismiss or
summary judgment (30.1%), they had an even higher rate of
settlement (43%) and remand to the Social Security Administration
(51.6%). Few social security cases, however, were pending (five of
ninety-three; 5.4%), implying that they are generally resolved quickly.
Part of understanding how pro se cases are resolved is determining
at what stage different categories of cases are dismissed. As stated
above, civil rights cases are dismissed most frequently at the first
stage, sua sponte (second row of Table XII). Although employment
discrimination and social security cases were more likely to be
dismissed on a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion
(third row of Table XII), they were less likely to be dismissed after
sua sponte review, motions to dismiss, or summary judgment motions
were filed (55.2% and 49.4%, respectively), than civil rights cases
(76.5% of the civil rights cases were dismissed). It is not surprising
then that employment discrimination cases settled at a higher rate
than civil rights and inmate-filed actions. If more employment
discrimination cases survived a sua sponte review and motions to
dismiss, then more employment discrimination cases would be
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available to settle.1°4 Interestingly, while civil rights and inmate-filed
cases were the most likely to be dismissed sua sponte, they were more
likely to be pending at the conclusion of the Study (16.7% and 12.3%,
respectively), than dismissed on a motion to dismiss (7.3% and 7.8%,
respectively). One conclusion is that while civil rights and inmate-
filed cases generally fail to state a claim upon a sua sponte review,
once a civil rights or inmate-filed case satisfies that review, the case is
generally time consuming, does not settle quickly, and remains on the
court's docket for a substantial amount of time.
It appears that the PLRA affected the stage in which pro se cases
are resolved. As seen in the second row of Table XIII, in 1995, one
year prior to the enactment of the PLRA, 72.4% of the inmate-filed
cases were dismissed sua sponte. This percentage dropped to 53.6%
in 1998 and to 50% in 1999, as seen in rows five and six. One could
argue that the decrease in sua sponte dismissed cases is due to the
PLRA. The argument is that by requiring all inmates to pay the $150
filing fee regardless of their ability to do so, the PLRA compels
inmates to be more selective in choosing which cases to file. Thus,
inmates screen out the identifiable frivolous complaints that would
otherwise be dismissed sua sponte.
A further indication that the PLRA affected the stage in which
cases were resolved is the increase in the number of settled cases. If
the PLRA deterred inmates from filing frivolous claims, one would
expect a rise in settled cases or plaintiff victories. As seen in the fifth
column of Table XII, from 1995 to 1997 there was a slight rise in the
percentage of cases settled. With a sizable amount of cases still
pending, the cases in 1998 experienced a significant rise in settled
cases, increasing to 14.3%. One could argue that this rise in settled
cases is another indication that the PLRA is deterring frivolous
inmate claims. Although settled cases dropped in 1999, 42.6% of the
cases were still pending.
TABLE XIII
INMATE-FILED CASES DisMISSALS BY YEAR
I TOTAL INMATE- S a Sp onie Dismissed on 105 Non-settledFILED CASES Disisd MrTID or Settled Pending plaintiff
S.J. victories
2 1995 122 89(72.4%) 9(7.3%) 11(8.9%) 4(3.3%) 1 (default judgment
104. Almost every social security settlement to remand occurred after a sua sponte
review, but before either a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion was filed.
105. The number of settled cases does not include settlements to remand the case
to the Social Security Administration.
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3 1996 101 71(72.3%) 12(11.9%) 11(10.9%) 4(2.3%) 0
4 1997 61 45(73.8%) 4(6.6%) 6(9.8%) 4(6.6%) 0
5 1998 56 30(53.6%) 3(5.4%) 8(14.3%) 11(19.6%) 0
6 1999 68 33(50%) 4(5.9%) 1(1.5%) 29(42.6%) 0
7 TOTALS 408 268(66.2%) 32(7.8%) 37(9.1%) 52(12.5%) I
The results set forth in Tables XII and XIII raise numerous
questions. For example, why are civil rights and inmate-filed cases
most frequently dismissed sua sponte? And why at rates significantly
higher than employment discrimination and social security cases? Is
sua sponte review a fair and expeditious method of adjudicating
cases? Are civil rights and inmate-filed cases subjected to a more
rigorous review process? If so, why? If not, why are so many civil
rights and inmate-filed cases frivolous? If the success rate among the
different categories of cases is comparable, is there any way to
expedite employment discrimination and social security cases to avoid
lengthy motions? Why are employment discrimination cases most
likely to be pending? Why are social security cases least likely to be
pending?
Finally, one glaring question is: why do so few pro se litigants win?
Pro se plaintiffs did not have a single judgment entered in their favor
in the 652 non-settled cases. All four pro se cases that went to trial
resulted in verdicts for the defendants and the sole pro se non-settled
victory was the result of an uncontested default judgment. Do the
most meritorious cases result in settlement, therefore reducing the
likelihood that a formidable pro se case will proceed to trial? If so, is
it possible to identify these cases shortly after they are filed and to
bring them to a quick resolution? Or if not, do pro se plaintiffs file
less meritorious claims? Or is the system so heavily weighed against
pro se litigants that a victory is highly improbable?
4. Reason for Dismissal 6
This Section reviews the reason each case was dismissed. As seen
in the seventh row of the Table, 535 of the 765 cases surveyed were
dismissed sua sponte, upon a motion to dismiss, or upon a summary
judgment motion-only these 535 cases contributed to this portion of
the Study. 7
106. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 8.
107. The remaining 230 cases were either settled (113 cases), still pending (eighty-
six cases), voluntarily dismissed (twenty-seven cases), or concluded in jury verdicts
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TABLE XIV
SUA SPONTE, MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSALS BY YEAR
pCo. Right. Ern ?y . Soc. Sec. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate1 i.R h. Discrim. Filing
2 1995 100 26 9 2 0 2 1 0 7 147 98
3 1996 91 17 11 0 1 1 1 5 9 136 83
4 1997 60 12 18 1 1 0 0 1 9 102 49
5 1998 41 8 6 0 0 1 1 2 7 66 33
6 1999 53 12 3 1 0 2 1 0 12 84 37
7 TOTALS 345 75 47 4 2 6 4 8 44 535 300
Each of these 535 cases was indiyidually reviewed to determine the
reason for dismissal. Table XV contains the results of the dismissed
cases and the reasons for dismissal separated by case type.
TABLE XV
REASON FOR DISMISSAL
1Civ. Right. Employ. ~ ~ ~ ~ F~ o InmateDisRg im. Soc. Sec. H... Far. Divers. . TOTALS Filin
104
2 FailuretoServe 28 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 41 25
Failure to State a
3 109 75 20 15 0 0 0 2 4 14 130 73
Claim
Statute of
4 110 14 11 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 29 10
Limitations
Subject Matter
5 11 20 4 0 1 2 4 0 0 9 40 14
Jurisdiction
Failre to Respotnd
6 117 31 3 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 42 29
o 60-day Order
(four cases).
108. Cases dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
109. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
110. The applicable statute of limitations depended on the type of case. For
example, most civil rights actions in New York are subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985);
see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-51 (1989). In contrast, social security cases
were required to be filed in the district court no more than sixty days after the
plaintiff received the Appeals Council letter from the Social Security Administration
denying him benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
111. Cases dismissed finding no jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332
(2000).
112. Plaintiffs were directed to file amended complaints within sixty days and
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TABLE XV
_____REASON FOR DISMISSAL
7 Failure to Prosecute 10 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 9
Transfer
8 113 50 2 I 0 0 1 1 0 3 58 43
(venue)
114
9 Immunity 28 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 33 22
Neitzke or
10 115 32 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 41 24
Dentn
116
11 Duplicete 0 2 I 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 9
Not a State
12 117 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 22
Actor
11813 Exhaustion 6 5 9 1 0 0 1 0 3 25 5
Personal
14 119 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11Involvemenr
120
15 Res Judicata 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
16 Moot 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
121
17 Conclusory 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
failed to do so.
113. Cases transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), 1406(a).
114. After the enactment of the PLRA, these cases were dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
115. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (ruling that claims that are
"delusional" or "wholly incredible" may be dismissed as factually baseless); Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-38 (1989) (holding that claims with clearly baseless
factual contentions may be dismissed).
116. Cases dismissed as duplicates of pending cases.
117. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (holding that alleged deprivation
must be "committed by a person acting under color of state law."); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (requiring that defendant in § 1983 suit
commit the alleged constitutional deprivation as a state actor).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(e) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in
civil rights cases); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies in social security cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b),(e),(f) (requiring exhaustion
of administrative remedies in employment discrimination cases); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210
(1996) (same); see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-67 (1975) (requiring
same under prior agency Department of Health & Human Services).
119. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant
must be personally liable in § 1983 action); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that liability for damages in § 1983 action may not be
based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability doctrines).
120. See Harborside Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Vogel, 959 F.2d 368, 372 (2d Cir.
1992) ("[W]hen a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the
merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter
bound '... as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim."') (citation omitted).
121. See, e.g., Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing
prisoner's retaliation claim in part because retaliation claims were "unsupported,
speculative, and conclusory."); Polur v. Raffe, 912 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that complaint must rely on overt acts and not "vague, prolix allegations of a
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TAB~LE XV
JREASQN FOR DISMISSAL
18 M-120 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2
123
19 Remand 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0
20 TOTAL CASES _345 75 46 4 2 6 4 0 44 534 300
While pro se cases were dismissed for a variety of reasons, some
reasons arose more frequently than others. The following is a list of
the ten most frequent bases for dismissal:
1. Failure to State a Claim;
2. Improper Venue;
3. Failure to Respond to a sixty-day Order;
4. Tie - Failure to Serve;
5. Tie - Neitzke or Denton;
6. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction;
7. Immunity of Defendants;
8. Statute of Limitations;
9. Defendant is Not a State Actor;
10. Tie - Failure to Prosecute; and
10. Tie - Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
As seen in the third row of Table XV, almost one quarter of the
cases were dismissed for the ubiquitous "failure to state a claim."
Because "failure to state a claim" generally implies that the
allegations set forth in the complaint have been reviewed and fail to
satisfy the substantive legal standards to set forth a cause of action, it
is not surprising that dismissal for failure to state a claim affected all
categories of cases during all years at fairly regular levels. Of the 345
civil rights cases dismissed for failure to state a claim, the most
frequently cited cases were Heck v. Humphrey,124 Estelle v. Gamble,125
conspiracy") (citations omitted).
122. Cases dismissed because the plaintiff was barred from filing future complaints
without seeking leave to file pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (preventing a prisoner
from bringing a civil action or appealing a judgment in a civil action or proceeding if
the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in
any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury).
123. All remands were pursuant to a motion to dismiss or summary judgment
motion and were remanded to the Social Security Administration.
124. 512 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1994) (holding that plaintiff cannot sustain an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and wrongful prosecution if he was convicted
of the offense for which he was arrested).
125. 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding that in order to successfully assert an Eighth
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and Sandin v. Conner.126
The next most common basis for dismissing a pro se complaint was
improper venue. As seen in the eighth row of Table XV, in more
than 10% of the pro se cases dismissed, the court found that the
litigant filed the complaint in the improper United States District
Court. This was especially true in civil rights and inmate-filed cases,
which were 86.2% (fifty of fifty-eight) and 74.1% (forty-three of fifty-
eight) of the transferred cases, respectively.2 7
In addition to improper venue, three other often-cited reasons for
dismissing civil rights actions (second column) and inmate-filed
actions (twelfth column) were that the defendants were immune from
suit (84.8% in civil rights actions (twenty-eight of thirty-three); 66.7%
in inmate-filed actions (twenty-two of thirty-three)), the defendants
were not state actors (100% in civil rights actions (twenty-seven of
twenty-seven); 81.5% in inmate-filed actions (twenty-two of twenty-
seven)), and the defendants were not personally involved with the
alleged constitutional deprivations (100% in civil rights actions
(eleven of eleven); 100% in inmate-filed actions (eleven of eleven)).
The requirements that the defendants be state actors and personally
involved are mandated by statute128 and caselaw 12 in civil rights cases.
Because these prerequisites are not applicable to other types of
actions, dismissal for failure to comply with them was found
exclusively in civil rights cases. Likewise, a high percentage of the
civil rights cases were dismissed on the grounds that the defendant
was immune. Because immunity is almost exclusively applied to state
actors, 3° dismissal on the grounds of immunity was almost exclusively
applied to civil rights cases.
As seen in the thirteenth row of Table XV, employment
Amendment claim based upon inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege that the
defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs).
126. 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (holding that the Due Process Clause only prohibits
confinement that "while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as
to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.").
127. Civil rights cases amounted to 64.6% of the total cases dismissed, significantly
lower than the 86.2% of the cases transferred.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
129. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (holding that defendant must be personally
liable in § 1983 action); see also Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(holding that liability for damages in § 1983 action may not be based on respondeat
superior or vicarious liability doctrines).
130. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403 (1997).
344
IMPROVING PRO SE CASES
discrimination and social security cases were the ones most frequently
dismissed for failure to exhaust. These two categories of cases have
statutory requirements that the litigant exhaust administrative
remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") in employment discrimination cases' and with the Social
Security Administration in social security cases. 32 Thus, it is not
surprising that these two categories of cases had higher rates of
dismissals for failure to exhaust-36% in social security cases and
20% in employment discrimination cases-than other categories of
cases.
While some patterns, such as dismissal for failure to exhaust, are
clear and logical due to applicable legal standards, others are
somewhat more perplexing. For example:
" Civil rights cases had a high tendency to be dismissed for failure to
comply with sixty-day orders (73.8%; thirty-one of forty-two), and
failure to serve the complaint (68.3%; twenty-eight of forty-one).
* Employment discrimination cases, which amounted to 14% of the
cases dismissed, had a high tendency to be dismissed for failure to
prosecute (40%; ten of twenty-five), failure to comply with the
statute of limitations (37.9%; eleven of twenty-nine), and failure to
serve the complaint (26.8%; eleven of forty-one).
" Social security cases, which amounted to 8.6% of the cases
dismissed, also had unique patterns, including high rates of failure
to prosecute (20%; five of twenty-five) and failure to comply with
sixty-day orders (14.3%; six of forty-two).
These results raise an infinite amount of questions. For example,
why do civil rights cases frequently get filed in the wrong jurisdiction?
Why are plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases more often
hampered by the statute of limitations than other plaintiffs? Is the
nature of an employment discrimination case too complex for the
litigants to grasp before the statute of limitations expires? Is the
complexity of employment discrimination cases also the reason why
the cases are frequently dismissed for failure to prosecute? Why are
inmate-filed cases and social security cases more likely to be
dismissed for failure to respond to a sixty-day order than other cases?
Do plaintiffs in social security cases experience more difficulty in
understanding the orders? Can litigants be better informed of the
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)-(f) (requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies in employment discrimination cases); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210 (1996) (same).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in social
security cases).
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clear statutory requirements of venue, exhaustion, and proper
defendants prior to filing their action? Can this be done in a manner
consistent with a neutral and impartial adjudicator?
While recording the justification for each dismissal, I found that a
substantial amount of cases were being dismissed pursuant to Denton
v. Hernandez.33 In Denton, the United States Supreme Court held
claims that are "delusional" or "wholly incredible" may be dismissed
as factually baseless.134 In considering the cases dismissed pursuant to
Denton, I decided to combine them with cases filed by individuals
claiming to be housed in a mental facility. Although rudimentary, the
following table sets forth a somewhat disturbing amount of cases
where the plaintiff was housed in a mental facility, or where the
dismissal was based on facts found to be "delusional" pursuant to
Denton.
TABLE XVI
CASES WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS HOUSED IN A MENTAL FACILITY
OR WHERE DISMISSAL WAS BASED ON DENTON
Rights Employ. S.. Ho. Pam. Diver. FOA Lab. Oth. TOTAS IneCivil DiFilin
2 1995 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
3 1996 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 14
4 1997 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20 16
5 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
6 1999 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 9
7 TOTALS 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 57 44
As shown in the second column in Table XVI, almost all of the
cases where the plaintiff was housed in a mental facility or where
dismissal was based on Denton were civil rights actions (96.5%). This
amounted to 12.2% (fifty-five of 451) of all civil rights actions, and
10.8% (forty-four of 408) of all inmate-filed actions. With over one in
every ten civil rights actions involving some issue concerning the
litigant's psychological status, this issue should be addressed or at
least discussed. Currently, however, these cases, and the litigants who
file them, are not provided with any form of additional or alternative
programs or assistance. Furthermore, prior to the filing of the case,
during the pendency of the case, and once the case is dismissed, there
133. 504 U.S. 25 (1992).
134. Id. at 32-33.
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is no special consideration of the litigant's psychological status, or the
best method to assist the litigant's actual needs.
135
What effects, if any, the PLRA has had on the reasons pro se cases
are dismissed is inconclusive. As seen in Table XVII, some of the
percentages of reasons for dismissal remained consistent over the
course of the Study. One would expect, however, that if the PLRA
deterred inmates from filing frivolous actions, then the number of
clearly dismissible claims would be reduced. This, however, does not
appear to be the case. While some easily identifiable and dismissible
claims were decreased, there was an increase in the number of fairly
common and correctable, but substantively deadly mistakes, such as
the failure to name a state actor (from 3.4% to 8.3%), or the naming
of a defendant who was immune (from 7.5% to 10.7%).
1999 TOTALS
Failure to 14 7 8 8 4 41Serve (9.6%) (5.1%) (7.8%) (12.1%) (4.8%) (7.7%)
Failure to 45 39 18 14 14 130
State a Claim (30.8%) (28.7%) (17.6%) (21.2%) (16.7%) (24.3%)
Statute of 8 5 10 3 3 29
Limitations (5.5%) (3.7%) (9.8%) (4.5%) (3.6%) (5.4%)
Subject 11 9 7 5 8 40
JMattei (7.5%) (6.6%) (6.9%) (7.6%) (9.5%) (7.5%)Jurisdiction
Failure to 12 2 12 4 12 42
6 Respond to
60-day Order (8.2%) (1.5%) (11.8%) (6.1%) (14.3%) (7.9%)
Failure to 2 10 8 5 0 25
Prosecute (1.4%) (7.4%) (7.8%) (7.6%) (0%) (4.7%)
Transfer 17 10 14 9 8 588 (venue) (11.6%) (7.4%) (13.7%) (13.6%) (9.5%) (10.9%)
9 11 5 4 4 9 33Immunity (7.5%) (3.7%) (3.9%) (6.1%) (10.7%) (6.2%)
135. See Munger, supra note 7, at 1812 (arguing that courts often wrongly assume
the litigant's psychosociological status and do not correctly handle possibly delusional
claims).
................ ' '--4
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10 Neitzke or 5(3.4%) 23 5 2 6 41Denton (16.9%) (4.9%) (3%) (7.1%) (7.7%)
3 3 1 5 14Duplicate 2(1.4%) (2.2%) (2.9%) (1.5%) (6%) (2.6%)
12 Not a State 5 2 3 7 27Actor (3.4%) 10(7.4%) (2%) (4.5%) (8.3%) (5.1%)
7 3 4 5 2513 Exhaustion 6(4.1%) (5.1%) (2.9%) (6.1%) (6%) (4.9%)
Personal 5 1 0 0 1114 Involvement 5(3.4%) (3.7%) (1%) ((1%) (0%) (2.1%)
0 0 1 1 315 Rea Judicata 1(75%) (0%) (0%) (1.5%) (1.2%) (.6%)
1 0 1 0 416 M-120 2(1.4%) (.7%) (0%) (1.5%) (0%) (.4%)
0 0 1 0 0 117 Conclusory (0%) (0%) (1%) (0%) (0%) (.2%)
0 0 1 0 1 21 (0%) (0%) (1%) (0%) (1.2%) (.7%)
19 TOTALCASES 146 136 97 64 83 526
5. Processing of Appeals 6
Although few pro se litigants were victorious at the district court
level, only 16.2% of the litigants appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. As seen in the second and third
rows of Table XVIII, the rate at which pro se plaintiffs appealed and
the rate at which those appeals were denied remained relatively
consistent among the largest case categories and inmate-filed cases.
136. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 9.
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TABLE XVIII
APPEALS BY CASE TYPE
1 ALL CASES Civil Rights Employ. Social Inmate
Discrim. Security Filing
124 of 765 66 of 451 26 of 136 9 of 93 53 of 408AppealFiled (16.2%) (14.6%) (19.1%) (9.7%) (13%)
3 Appeal 115 of 124 61 of 66 25 of 26 7of9 50 of 53
Denied (92.7%) (92.4%) (96.2%) (77.8%) (94.3%)
4 Appeal 7 of 124 3of66 1of26 2of9 2of53
Granted (5.6%) (4.5%) (3.8%) (22.2%) (3.8%)
5 Appeal 2 of 124 2of66 0of26 0of9 1 of 53
Pending (1.6%) (3%) (0%) (0%) (1.9%)
As seen in the second row of Table XVIII, social security cases had
the lowest rate of appeals filed. This is possibly due to the high rate
of settlement, making an appeal unnecessary. Interestingly, social
security cases also had the lowest rate of dismissal on appeal at
77.8%, as seen in the third row. Pro se appeals were denied at an
average rate of 92.7% (115 of 124). As seen in the fourth row of
Table XVIII, only seven of the 124 appeals were granted (5.6%) and
two of the seven were in social security cases. Thus, even though
social security cases made up only 9.7% of the appeals filed, they
amounted to 28.6% of the appeals granted. Two of the 124 appeals
were pending. Both pending appeals were civil rights cases and were
from 1995 and 1996, respectively.
As seen in Table XIX, the percentage of cases where an appeal was
filed and denied remained consistent, ranging from 13.3% to 19% and
85.7% to 100%, respectively. The only variation to the yearly
consistencies appeared in the overall rate of in forma pauperis
requests at the appellate level, which dipped 30% in 1997.137
Although it coincides with the enactment of the PLRA, the reason for
this dip is unclear. As seen in Table XX, the PLRA did not appear to
have an effect on inmate filings by year or whether the plaintiff
requested in forma pauperis status-both remained consistent over
the course of the Study.
138
137. See FED. R. APP. P. 24 (setting forth in forma pauperis for appeal to United
States Circuit Courts).
138. There was, however, an overall decrease in appellate in forma pauperis filings
in 1997, as seen in Tbl. XIX.
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TABLE XX
APPEAL BY YEAR
1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 TOTALS
29 33 21 22 19 124 of 765
2 Appeal filed (15.8%) (19%) (15.2%) (17.5%) (13.3%) (16.2%)
3 Appeal 27 30 18 21 19 115of124
denied (93.1%) (90.9%) (85.7%) (95.5%) (100%) (92.7%)
4 Appeal 1 3 2 1 0 7 of 124
granted (3.4%) (9.1%) (9.5%) (4.5%) (0%) (5.6%)
5 Appeal 1 0 1 0 0 2 of 124
pending (3.4%) (0%) (4.8%) (0%) (0%) (1.6%)
IFP 25 28 11 18 17 99 of 124requested (86.2%) (84.8%) (52.4%) (81.8%) (89.5%) (79.8%)
Motion for
recon. 5 2 2 13
granted
8 TOTAL 184 174 138 126 143 765CASES
TABLE XX
INMATE APPEALS BY YEAR
1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 TOTALS
2 Appeal filed 13 14 7 10 9 53 of 408(13%)
3 Appeal 12 13 6 10 9 50 of 53
denied (94.3%)
4 Appeal 1 1 0 0 0 2 of 53
granted (3.8%)
5 Appeal 0 0 1 0 0 1 of 53
pending (1.9%)
6 IFP 12 12 7 9 7 47 of 53
requested (88.7%)
Motion for
recon. granted 2 1 11
Finally, thirteen motions for reconsideration were granted out of
the thirty-two that were filed. t4° Of these thirteen motions, six were
granted following the dismissal of the action for failure to serve the
summons and complaint. This raises the question of whether it is
possible to rectify any service issues prior to dismissal of the action,
motion for reconsideration, or reopening.
139. The majority of these motions were filed pursuant to FED. R. Clv. P. 59-60.
140. For the raw data on motions for reconsideration, see infra App. § 9.
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C. Burdens Pro Se Cases Have on the Court
This final Section concerns the burdens pro se cases impose on the
court. The analysis is reported in two sub-sections corresponding to
groupings ten and eleven in the Appendix.' The two sub-sections
use different methods to gauge the time and resources used in
adjudicating pro se cases. The first sub-section, "Prior Case Filings in
the Court," synthesizes the data regarding how often pro se litigants
file multiple complaints, how many complaints they file, and whether
or not they are warned or barred from filing future complaints with
the court.142 The second sub-section, "Time and Docket Entries in the
Court," examines how long each case was pending in the court and
how many docket entries each case had before it was closed.
1. Prior Case Filings in the Court'43
As seen in the seventh row of Table XXI, almost half of the pro se
plaintiffs surveyed had previously filed a complaint in the Southern
District of New York." As seen in the bottom right-hand corner of
Table XXI, 45% (344 of 765) of all the plaintiffs surveyed filed at
least one prior complaint in the Southern District of New York.
TABLE XXI
NUMBER OF CASES REVIEWED WHERE PLAINTIFF [PIOR
__ ____ CASE IN THE Cot -R-
Civil Employ. Soc. Inmate
Rights Discrim. Sec He. F.rn Die. FOIA Lob. 0th TOTAL Filing
2 1995 60 12 2 0 1 1 0 0 6 82 58
3 1996 55 8 3 0 0 1 0 3 7 77 51
4 1997 39 4 6 1 0 0 0 0 6 56 32
5 1998 36 8 4 0 0 0 0 2 7 57 31
6 1999 45 12 3 3 0 0 1 0 8 72 45
141. See infra App. §§ 10-11.
142. For purposes of this Article, a "bar order" is an order prohibiting a pro se
plaintiff from filing future complaints with the Court unless she first seeks leave to
file the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
143. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 10.
144. The search for prior complaints was limited to the Southern District of New
York and from the years 1983-1999.
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TABLE XXI
NUMBER OF CASES REVIEWED WHERE PLAINTIFF HAD PRIOR
CASE IN THE COURT
TOTA
L% 235 18 4 1 1 5 34 2172 3 5 ( 3 24.4 ( 2 5 ( 0 ( 6 3 3 4 4 ( 5 .
7 OF (52.1 4(32.4 (19.4 (66.7 (33.3 (25 %) (45%) (53.2
CASES %) %) %) %) %) %) %) %) %)
FILED)
TOTA
8 CASES 451 136 93 6 3 8 4 10 54 765 408
FILED I
Although the frequency of repeat filers145 varied among the
different categories of cases, repeat filers were not limited to a
particular category of case or a particular year. As shown in the
seventh row, the frequency of repeat filers varied from 63% in the
"others" category (thirty-four of fifty-four) to 19.4% in social security
cases (eighteen of ninety-three). Other notable results were:
* Over one-half, 53.2% (217 of 408), of inmate plaintiffs filed a prior
complaint with the court.
* 52.1% (235 of 451) of civil rights plaintiffs filed a prior complaint
with the court.
0 Almost one-third of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases
32.4% (forty-four of 136) had a prior complaint in the court.
* Although the studies were small, 66.7% (four of six) and 50% (five
of ten) of plaintiffs in housing and labor cases, respectively, filed a
prior complaint in the court.
The amount of inmate repeat filers decreased following the
enactment of the PLRA.46 The decrease corresponded to the amount
of pro se cases filed overall. As the amount of inmate-filed cases
decreased, so too did the number of repeat filers. From 1995 to 1998,
the total non-habeas, pro se cases decreased 31.1% from 1,843 to
1,270. In 1999, pro se cases increased 12.9% to 1,434. This decrease
and subsequent increase corresponded to the number of repeat filers
during the same years. As seen in rows two through five in Table
XXI, from 1995 to 1998 repeat filers dropped from eighty-two to fifty-
seven -a decrease of 30.5% -and then, increased to seventy-two in
1999-an increase of 26.3% -as seen in row six of Table XXI. Thus,
while the PLRA may have reduced the number of complaints overall,
and has a specific provision to address repeat filers, it did not
145. For purposes of this Article, "repeat filers" refers to litigants who previously
filed at least one complaint in the court.
146. Compare rows 2-3, with 4-6 in Tbl. XXI.
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specifically affect those who may be most prone to repeat filing.
TABLE XXI .
PRIORS BY YEAR
1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 TOTALS
2 Repeat filers 82 77 56 57 72 344
3 Average of 5.3 4.15 4.29 4.33 8.5
priors
4 Bar orders 11 9 9 1 11 41
5 Bar warnings 1 0 0 3 7 11
Average of
6 complaints filed 11 3.67 1.11 .67 4.64
after bar order
The average number of previously filed complaints per repeat filer
fluctuated among the different categories of cases.147 In civil rights
cases, the average number of complaints previously filed per repeat
filer varied slightly from year to year, from 4.5 to seven complaints.
In employment discrimination cases, the average number of prior
complaints filed per plaintiff varied widely from 1.5 to thirteen prior
complaints. Thus, while civil rights plaintiffs were more likely to
average a higher number of previously filed complaints per repeat
filer than employment discrimination plaintiffs, employment
discrimination plaintiffs were more likely to include an aberrant
plaintiff who filed an exorbitant amount of complaints. 148
As seen in the fourth row of Table XXII, the total number of bar
orders entered was forty-one (5.4% of the total cases). Of these
forty-one, thirty-six were entered against a pro se plaintiff in a civil
rights action (8% of the civil rights cases overall). Only three of the
bar orders were entered against a plaintiff in an employment
discrimination case (2.2% of the employment discrimination cases
overall).'49 The remaining two bar orders were entered against
plaintiffs in the "other" category. Bar orders were entered against
inmates in twenty cases (4.9% of the total inmate-filed cases).
Inmate-filed plaintiffs were less likely than pro se plaintiffs overall,
and significantly less likely than the plaintiffs in civil rights, non-
147. For the raw data on the number of complaints filed per litigant, see infra App.
§ 10.
148. One litigant filed fifty-seven complaints in one year-all but two were
dismissed sua sponte. A bar order was entered against him in an employment
discrimination case.
149. See, e.g., supra note 148.
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inmate filed cases, to have a bar order entered against them.
While bar orders appeared to reduce the amount of complaints
filed by repeat filers, the orders did not always stop the filing of
complaints. This was particularly true in employment discrimination
cases where the aberrant litigant continued to file numerous
complaints after he was barred.
2. Time and Docket Entries in the Court5°
This final sub-section examines the time and resources used in
adjudicating pro se cases. 5' Table XXIII contains the average
number of days each case was pending. The Table is separated by
case type and year. As seen in rows two, six, ten, fourteen, and
eighteen of Table XXIII, cases dismissed sua sponte were pending in
the court the least amount of time. This is particularly important
because, as shown in sub-section six above, sua sponte dismissals were
the most common method of terminating cases (55.6% of the cases).
Furthermore, all sua sponte dismissed cases were pending on the
court's docket for significantly less time than the average case in the
court.'52  Thus, the majority of pro se cases-cases dismissed sua
sponte-spent the least amount of time in the court.
As seen in rows two, six, ten, fourteen, and eighteen, sua sponte
dismissed civil rights, inmate-filed, FOIA, and diversity cases were
consistently the quickest cases to be dismissed. These cases remained
on the court's docket for less than six months. Conversely,
employment discrimination and housing cases that were dismissed sua
sponte were pending on the court's docket almost always over six
months.
150. For the raw data corresponding to this Section, see infra App. § 11.
151. While this sub-section does examine the docket entries and time pro se cases
are pending, there are some considerations of time and resources not quantifiable.
For example, a significant amount of time and resources are devoted to interpreting
pro se pleadings and elaborating on courtroom procedures, which are very difficult to
quantify.
152. Compare Tbl. XXIII, with the average time all cases were pending in the
Southern District of New York: 1995-300 days; 1996-270 days; 1997-300 days;
1998-270 days; 1999-270 days, and across the nation: 1995-270 days; 1996-240
days; 1997-270 days; 1998-270 days; 1999-270 days. U.S. CTS,: SECOND CIRCUIT
REPORT 1999, at 155, Tbl. 11 (2000); U.S. CTS.: SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 1997
"Statistics," Tbl. 11 (1998); U.S. CTS.: SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 1996, at 15, Tbl. 11
(1997).
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. I TABLE XXIII
DAYS PENDING IN COURT BY YEAR...
1 Civil Employ. Soc. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. InmateRights Discfim. Sec. Filing
1995 Days
2 pending in 157.36 357. 72 159 260 0 135 70 0 128.33 146.26
sua sponte
dis.
1995 Days
3 pending for 575.90 587.50 500 300 320 960 0 0 100 592,18
others
1995 Days
4 pending with 1235 953.33 0 0 0 1670 0 0 0 1452.5
app. counsel
5
1996 Days
6 pending in 165.13 190.83 76.67 0 60 0 125 116.25 139.38 173.73
sua sponte
dis.
1996 Days
7 pending for 808. 97 663.33 445.63 0 0 535 0 370 600 791.43
others
1996 Days
8 pending with 831 1056.67 675 0 0 0 0 0 840 831
app. counsel
9
1997 Days
10 pending in 178.70 359.17 265 235 110 0 0 0 166.88 165.63
sua sponte
dis.
1997 Days
11 pending for 591.36 525.94 502.78 0 0 0 0 740 573.33 557.89
others
1997 Days
12 pending with 390 948.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 390
app. counsel 1
13
1998 Days
14 pending in 179.34 301.67 730 0 0 360 115 0 114 178.33
sua sponte
dis.
1998 Days
15 pending for 496.92 378.57 424.4 0 0 0 0 442.5 452 468.92
others
1998 Days
16 pending with 577.5 0 345 0 0 0 0 0 0 577.5
app. counsel
17
1999 Days
18 pending in 162. 17 174.09 236.67 315 0 142.5 0 0 130.42 173.94
sua sponle
dis. I
1999 Days
19 pending for 385 317 268.75 0 0 0 525 0 0 385
others 
_
1999 Days
20 pending with 555 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 555
pp. counsel
153. A "0" for docket entries signifies that there were no cases of that type selected
during that particular year. To enhance readability, Rows five, nine, thirteen and
seventeen have been purposely left vacant.
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There was a significant difference in the amount of time cases
dismissed sua sponte were pending on the court's docket compared
with those cases not dismissed sua sponte. As seen in rows three,
seven, eleven, fifteen, and nineteen in Table XXIII, cases not
dismissed sua sponte were often pending on the court's docket three
to six times longer than those dismissed sua sponte. The cases not
dismissed sua sponte that were pending the longest were the civil
rights, inmate-filed, and diversity cases, while the social security cases
not dismissed sua sponte were pending the least amount of time.
The length of time sua sponte dismissals and non-sua sponte
dismissals were pending varied by the category of the case. For
example, as seen in rows two, six, ten, fourteen, and eighteen, the civil
rights and inmate-filed cases were consistently dismissed sua sponte
(157-179 days) in less time than the other cases. When civil rights and
inmate-filed cases were not dismissed sua sponte (rows three, seven,
eleven, fifteen, and nineteen), however, they were some of the longest
pending cases (385-809 days). In contrast, employment
discrimination cases, which were consistently pending on the court's
docket longer than the other sua sponte dismissals (174-359 days),
were closed in less time than the other non-sua sponte cases (317-663
days). In sum, while civil rights cases were dismissed most often and
most quickly sua sponte, when they survived a sua sponte review, they
were pending the longest. Conversely, employment discrimination
cases, which often took the longest amount of time to dismiss sua
sponte, often took the least amount of time to dismiss after a sua
sponte review.
TABLE XXIV
NUMBER OF DOCKET ENTRIES BY YEAR" _
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Far. Divers. FOIA Labor Oth. Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
1995
Docket
entries 7.07 16.36 8.17 6 II 10 6 I0 7.5 6.60
in SUB
dis.
154. A "0" for docket entries signifies that there were no cases of that type selected
during that particular year. To enhance readability, Rows five, nine, thirteen and
seventeen have been purposely left vacant.
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1999
Docket
entries 20.57 19.8 11.13 0 0 0 20 0 0 20.57
for
others
1999
Docket
2 entres 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
0 with
app.
counsel
The number of docket entries in each case was not directly
proportional to the amount of time a case was pending on the court's
docket. Rather the number of docket entries appeared to fluctuate
by case type and how the case was resolved. For example, as seen in
rows two, six, ten, fourteen, and eighteen of Table XXIV, most sua
sponte dismissed cases varied only slightly in the number of docket
entries, usually ranging from seven to ten entries. The most probable
reason for this is that the cases were dismissed at the same stage
regardless of case type. The sole exception in sua sponte dismissed
cases was employment discrimination cases. As seen in the third
column of Table XXIV, employment discrimination cases often had
the highest amount of docket entries per sua sponte dismissal, ranging
from nine to sixteen. Thus, not only were employment discrimination
cases pending on the court's docket the longest of all the sua sponte
cases, but also they required the most docket entries.
The number of docket entries per case increased significantly once
a case survived a sua sponte review. Cases not dismissed sua sponte
had two to four times as many docket entries as cases dismissed sua
sponte.55 In particular, civil rights and inmate-filed cases experienced
a large increase in docket entries after a sua sponte review-
increasing from seven to ten entries in sua sponte dismissals, to
nineteen to thirty three in non-sua sponte dismissals. Social security
cases were not only the sua sponte cases most quickly dismissed, but
also they experienced the least amount of docket entries in non-sua
sponte dismissed cases. On average, social security cases consisted of
one-half of the number of docket entries as in other cases. Another
indication of the complexity of employment discrimination cases is
that, in several instances, the number of docket entries for a sua
sponte dismissal in employment discrimination cases (nine to sixteen
entries) exceeded the number of docket entries in non-sua sponte
dismissed social security cases (eleven to seventeen entries).
Of all the cases surveyed, the cases that were the most time
155. Compare rows 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, with 3, 7, 11,15, 19 in Tb. XXIV.
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consuming and had the most docket entries were those where the
litigant had some legal representation. As seen in rows four, eight,
twelve, sixteen, and twenty in Tables XXIII and XXIV, counseled
cases were pending on the court's docket 70-80% longer than non-
counseled cases. Furthermore, counseled cases generally consisted of
50% more docket entries than non-counseled cases.
Finally, Table XXV sets forth the number of cases surveyed where
the Pro Se Office had some form of written communication with the
litigant and the average number of communications per case. As seen
in the seventh row, plaintiffs in civil rights actions were by far the
most likely to be in communication with the Pro Se Office, with 203
of the 451 plaintiffs (45%) having some written communication with
the Office. Inmates also had frequent communication with the Pro Se
Office, with 163 out of 408 (40%) inmates having some
communication with the Office.
TABLE XXV
BURDEN ON COURT 1995 CASES__
Civil Empoy. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS anmateRights Discrim. Filing
1995 Cases
2 correspo- 45 8 0 0 0 1 37
nding with (ave. 1.64) (ave. 1) (ave.l) 0 0 0 54 (ave. 2.19)
Pro Se Off.
1996 Cases
correspo- 36 5 4 32
nding with (ave. 3.31) (ave. 1.4) (ave. 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 (ave. 3.44)
Pro Se Off.
1997 Cases
correspo- 36 4 1 26
nding with (ave. 1.72) (ave. 1.75) (ave. 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 1) 1) 42 (ave. 1.08)
Pro Se Off.
1998 Cases
5 correspo- 42 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 37
nding with (ave. 1.62) (ave. 1.25) (ave. 1.33) (ave. 2)
Pro Se Off.
1999 Cases
6 correspo- 44 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 31
nding with (ave. 2.61) (ave. 2) (ave. 1.5) (ave. 1.81)
Pro Se Off.
7 TOTALS 203 26 13 0 0 1 0 0 1 244 163
D. Summation of Pro Se Litigation Characteristics
An enormous amount of information can be extracted from this
Study. I have set forth above some of the most prominent and telling
characteristics of pro se litigation based on the Study. This Section
combines those characteristics to paint an overall picture of pro se
litigation, and to set forth what are statistically the prototypical pro se
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cases. The hope is that from the final results we will have a better
understanding of pro se litigation and will be able to identify the best
methods to address it.
As stated above, 89% of the cases surveyed were civil rights,
employment discrimination, and social security cases. 56  Of these
three, social security cases experienced the largest increase in the
number of cases filed during the five years covered in the Study.'57
While civil rights actions experienced the largest decrease, the
majority of the decrease occurred in the two and one-half years
following the enactment of the PLRA.'58 In 1999, the final year of the
Study, the number of civil rights cases increased, but still remained
below their 1995 levels.'59
While most of the surveyed characteristics fluctuated based on the
category of the case, some characteristics were applicable to all cases.
For example, almost all pro se plaintiffs, regardless of case type or
year of filing, submitted an in forma pauperis application to waive the
filing fee."6° Furthermore, those applications were almost always
granted. 6' Pro se plaintiffs almost always filed a complaint seeking
monetary relief. 16 The majority of the complaints were dismissed sua
sponte, 63 usually for failure to state a claim."6 Excluding cases that
settled, a pro se plaintiff almost never received a judgment in his
favor. 65 Despite this, few pro se plaintiffs appealed and most appeals
were dismissed." The cases that did settle were generally settled for
small amounts of money,67 and/or with an attorney representing the
pro se party.1
61
As stated above, specific characteristics were more applicable to
some case categories than to others. Table XXVI sets forth the most
common characteristics of inmate-filed, civil rights, employment
discrimination, and social security cases. While some precautions
156. See supra Tbl. I and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Tbl. I and accompanying text.
159. See supra Thl. I and accompanying text.
160. See supra Tbls. IV & V and accompanying text.
161. See supra Tbl. IV and accompanying text.
162. See supra Tbl. VI and accompanying text.
163. See supra Tbl. XII and accompanying text.
164. See supra Tbl. XV and accompanying text.
165. See supra Tl. XIII and accompanying text
166. See supra Tl. XVIII and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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must be taken when making generalizations such as these, they do
begin to give some concrete notions about pro se litigation.
TABLE XXVI I
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRO SE LITIGATION
CIVIL RIGHTS EMPLOY. DISCRIM. SOC. SEC. INMATE-FILEDI _I I CASES
* 1/3 of cases had
multiple defendants
S1/3 of cases had at
least one government
defendant
* IFP made and granted
* Few request equitable
relief
* Many file amended
complaints
Most are dismissed on
motions to dismiss
* Dismissed for failure
to exhaust; failure to
prosecute; failure to
comply with statute of
limitations
* Spend significant
amounts of time on
the docket because
dismissed on motion
* Dismissal on motion is
fewer days than civil
rights dismissal on
motion
' The few that are
dismissed sua sponte
spend longer on the
docket than other sua
sponte dismissals
* Just as likely to be
settled than to be
dismissed sua sponte
* Only dismissed sua
sponte or by motion
* More likely to get
counsel on own than
through court
* Government defendant
* IFP made and granted
* Request monetary relief
* Government frequently
requests extension of
time to file answer
* 60-day order is often
entered
* Few amended
complaints
* Few applications for
counsel
* Most are dismissed on
motions to dismiss
* Dismissed for failure to
exhaust; failure to
prosecute; failure to
comply with 60-day
order
* Spend less time on
docket than other
motions to dismiss
* docket than some sua
sponte dismissals
* Few sua sponte
dismissals
* Settled often
* Settlement is almost
always to remand to
Social Security
Administration
* Low appeal rate
" Inmate-filed
" Multiple
defendants named
" At least one
government
defendant named
" IFP made and
granted
" Request monetary
relief
" 1/3 request
equitable relief
" Many plaintiffs
housed in
Psychiatric Facility
or complaints
dismissed based on
Denton
* Sua sponte
dismissed
" Dismissed for
failure to state a
claim; improper
venue; immunity;
no state action; no
personal
involvement
" Most spend a short
time on the docket
because they are
sua sponte
dismissed
" When not sua
sponte dismissed
spend the longest
time on the docket
" When not
dismissed sua
sponte high rate of
application for
counsel
" Most likely to
actually get
counsel once
application is
granted
III. SUGGESTED INITIATIVES
The principal objectives of the following suggestions are two-fold.
First, the suggestions are designed to provide the litigant with a
2002]
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meaningful opportunity to have her claims adjudicated in a fair and
dignified manner. Second, the suggestions seek to reduce the burden
pro se cases have on the court, while not sacrificing the court's
impartiality. The hope is that the litigant will feel as though she has
been afforded due process, the court will be able to allocate more
time adjudicating meritorious claims,169 and the judges' caseload will
be reduced.7 '
In an effort to provide pro se litigants with their "day in court," the
following suggestions are ultimately designed to make available the
assistance of trained counsel.' As shown above, only fifty-four of the
765 cases reviewed received some assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, only twenty-four of the fifty-four received that
assistance via the court. Currently, in order to receive assistance of
counsel through the court in the Southern District of New York, a pro
se litigant must make an application for counsel (thus, implying that
the litigant must be aware that this procedure is available to her). If
the application is granted, there is no guarantee that the litigant will
receive any legal assistance. Volunteer attorneys agreeing to accept
pro se cases pro bono review cases where an application has been
granted. If the volunteer attorney is willing to accept one of the
cases, then the attorney contacts the litigant.
I believe the current system fails to harness the willingness of some
attorneys to accept pro bono cases and fails to provide a service to the
court. Therefore, the following suggestions seek to obtain legal
counsel for pro se litigants not only in order to protect the litigant's
rights, but also to provide the court with an invaluable service of
substantively screening out frivolous complaints. If a litigant is able
169. Brooks, supra note 14, at 13 ("the more efficiently judges work with pro se
cases, the more time is left for more significant cases.").
170. Consideration has also been given to the possibility that providing too many
services to pro se litigants may actually provide a disservice, in that it may actually
promote pro se litigation. As one judge stated, "I would not suggest any rule changes
which would only encourage more pro se activity and the added burdens attached
thereto." Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 19. Some in the private bar may also argue
that assisting pro se litigants would take away potential clients. Pro se cases,
however, are cases that "lawyers aren't getting.., anyway." Brooks, supra note 14,
at 13; see also Gibeaut, supra note 29, at 28 ("the trend isn't going to rob lawyers of
business, because most people who don't hire attorneys either can't afford them or
don't trust them.").
171. Obtaining pro bono counsel without the court's assistance was made
significantly more difficult in 1996 when Congress restricted the financial resources of
the Federal Office of Legal Services, which was created to assist and fund pro bono
legal services. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321.
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to receive legal representation, the litigant may be discouraged from
filing a clearly frivolous complaint or at least from filing a complaint
in the improper court. The suggestions also consider that some
attorneys, while willing to provide some pro bono services, are
unable, due to time and resources, to fully represent a litigant.
Therefore, the suggestions contain numerous limited representation
options for attorneys to assist pro se litigants. 17 2
I also suggest that if volunteer pro bono services are not
forthcoming, the court should consider requiring mandatory pro bono
activity as part of being admitted to the Southern District of New
York.73 Currently, New York State does not have a mandatory pro
bono minimum that attorneys must complete each year.174 The court
could require larger firms with several members admitted to the court
to accept a case pro bono, or provide some of the limited services
suggested below.'75
As stated above, I believe the best method of providing pro se
litigants with their day in court is to grant them legal assistance, 76
however, this is not always a viable option. Securing legal counsel for
pro se litigants has been hampered by monetary constraints, lack of
court initiatives, and a failure of the bar to structure a system where
legal representation is always an option. Therefore, the following
172. Advertisement of the following suggestions will have to be carefully
considered, so that the suggestions provide a service to the litigants and the court.
173. See generally Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a
Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School
Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1879 ("Pro bono legal service
efforts have barely made a dent in the hugely unmet need for legal representation
among the poor.").
174. The only state I was able to find that had a mandatory pro bono hourly
minimum was Florida. See also Patricia R. Gleason, Government Lawyers Making a
Difference: Pro Bono and Public Service, 73 FLA. B. J. 47, 48 (1999). While Florida
set its mandatory minimum at twenty hours per year the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 6.1 has recommended a minimum of fifty pro bono hours
per year, per attorney. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1990).
175. Alternatively, the court should consider restructuring its pro bono attorney
services. As mentioned above, currently, a pro se case may have an application for
counsel granted, but no attorney ever assigned. In addition, an attorney may be
listed as a volunteer pro bono attorney with the court (often used as a promotional
piece in firm brochures), but fail to accept any pro se cases. I recommend that all
attorneys and firms wishing to be named by the court as pro bono list attorneys be
placed on a list. The court should simply proceed down the list assigning counsel to
every new case where an application is granted.
176. "The adage that 'a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client' is the
product of years of experience by seasoned litigators." Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432,
437-38 (1991).
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suggestions are also designed to empower litigants to constitutionally
prosecute their claims when assistance of counsel is not forthcoming.
The suggestions take a systematic approach from the drafting phase
of the complaint through to the resolution of the case. The
suggestions are presented in the following five sub-sections
corresponding to the basic framework of pro se litigation: 1) Pre-filing
and Drafting of the Complaint; 2) Post-filing and Judicial Review of
the Complaint; 3) Evaluation of Case for Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR"); 4) Discovery Process; and 5) Judicial
Intervention.
A. Pre-filing and Drafting of the Complaint
The first critical point in providing legal assistance to pro se
litigants occurs during the drafting phase of the complaint. This stage
is the first, and often the only, communication the litigant has with the
court. As shown in the second row of Table XII, over one-half of all
pro se complaints are dismissed sua sponte. While civil rights actions,
the majority of the cases dismissed sua sponte generally did not
absorb a significant amount of the court's time and resources,177 the
accumulated result of dismissing hundreds of cases sua sponte each
year places a significant burden on the court. Furthermore, as shown
in Table XV, a considerable number of cases were dismissed for
clearly identifiable and correctable reasons such as improper venue.
Providing quality legal advice prior to the filing of the complaint is
specifically intended to address this issue. The hope is that providing
assistance prior to the filing of the complaint will reduce the number
of frivolous complaints. Furthermore, clearer and more legible
papers will be submitted to the court. This, in turn, will increase the
amount of time and resources the court will have to allocate to
meritorious pro se cases.
The following three programs are designed to provide assistance to
pro se litigants during the drafting of the complaint. 7 8 The first
program is envisioned as a collaboration between the Pro Se Office
177. See supra Tbls. XXIII & XXIV (setting forth time and docket entries for sua
sponte dismissed cases).
178. I recognize that these three programs, similar to all the programs suggested,
involve monetary concerns. The funding for the programs has to be carefully
considered to maximize the court's limited resources. The hope is that the money
invested in the programs will be recouped by increasing the efficiency of the court.
In addition, a large portion of the services rendered through the programs is
envisioned to be met through volunteer work.
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and the private bar. The Pro Se Office could serve as a self-help
center of information for people considering whether to file pro se. 179
Condensing all the relevant and available information in one office
would streamline the litigation, alleviate some of the court's burden,
and allow the litigant to have a clearer idea of where to access
information. The information available from the Pro Se Office could
include:
PROPER FORMS FOR FILING. The forms must be simple, written in
plain language without any legalese, updated on regular basis, and
accessible to the public for review. The forms could be centralized
and circulated to the applicable federal district courts in a
computerized format so that each district court could alter the forms
accordingly. This would reduce the work each district court would be
required to do in updating the forms. 8°0
BROCHURES ON SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF LAW. Similar to the
forms, the brochures must be written in plain language and updated
on a regular basis. The brochures should include educational
material on the court process and substantive areas of law. They
should also be designed in conjunction with the forms, so that
explanation of a substantive area of law could easily be applied to the
proper form.
SELF-HELP LIBRARY OF BOOKS AND VIDEOS. Whether the litigant
is able to obtain counsel or not, she must be able to educate herself to
prepare to prosecute her case. This includes reviewing available
books on how to file pro se. The books should be maintained and
carefully monitored by the Pro Se Office to ensure that they are
accurate and applicable to federal litigation.1 ' Similarly, the Pro Se
Office could maintain a library of videos accessible to the public
particularly in the areas of civil rights, employment discrimination,
and social security. The videos could contain substantive and
procedural advice. Having videos would also serve the purpose of
179. The Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, is at the forefront of the
"self-service" center. For a description of the "self-service" center in Maricopa
County, see MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 73-75.
180. Responsibility for updating brochures and forms could rotate among the
district courts, thereby reducing the workload of all the courts and creating some
consistency among district courts.
181. By maintaining a library, the court implicitly validates the book. Therefore, in
addition to the Pro Se Office carefully maintaining the books, an agreement should
be worked out with the publishers and authors to update the books in return for the
court's "seal of approval." In addition, litigants must be made aware that the books
are not the adopted opinion of the court or the Pro Se Office.
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assisting any litigant who is functionally illiterate.182
INTERNET SERVICES. In this age of ever increasing access to the
Internet, the court should avail itself of the Internet's benefits.183 The
Pro Se Office should make the website easy to use. The site should
have access to court forms, brochures, and answers to common
questions. In addition, the website should contain an index of useful
websites reviewed by the Pro Se Office and books on pro se
litigation.184 This may also require the court to have computers with
access to the Internet available for public use.
PERSONAL INTERACTION. Prior to the filing of a complaint, the
pro se litigant should have access to a writ clerk/paralegal, who could
provide the litigant with procedural advice.
LIST OF PRO BONO SERVICES OR ATTORNEYS. The Pro Se Office
should maintain an updated list of pro bono services, including law
school clinics and attorneys that are available for advice and
assistance in drafting the complaint as well as possible referral
services.
While the Pro Se Office would provide the much needed self-help
and procedural advice, the private bar could provide a special
program designed to complement the Pro Se Office in the area of
substantive advice. First, the private bar could set up a kiosk in the
court where pleadings could be accepted for substantive review prior
to filing. The attorneys working in the kiosk would be separate from
those in the Pro Se Office and could advise the litigant as to the
appropriate action. It would be made clear to the litigants that the
attorneys are not representing them, but are there to provide limited
182. See, e.g., Constance G. Evans, Enhancing Citizen Understanding of and Access
to the Probate Process at D.C. Superior Court, (SJI-93-12A-A-258) (State Justice
Inst.) (providing an illustration of a video containing substantive and procedural
advice).
183. See, e.g., Ariz. Sup. Ct.'s Self Service Center, available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/selfserv/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2002); see also the
Florida State Court's pro se assistance web site, available at http://www.flcourts.org/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
184. Some United States District Courts have useful Pro Se Handbooks on the
Internet. See, e.g., Pro Se Handbook: United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York, at http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/pdf/prosehb.pdf (last visited
Oct. 20, 2002); Le Parker, The Manual for the Litigant Filing Without Counsel (2d ed.
1997), in U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, PRO SE HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.id.uscourts.gov/pro-se.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002); Lisa Mesler,
Necessity of Exhausting Available Remedies (Lisa Mesler et al. eds., 1995), in U.S.
DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, supra note 184, available at http://www.
id.uscourts.gov/pro-se.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
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advice pertaining to the complaint.185 In addition, the attorneys
should be insulated from malpractice suits. 186 While the court should
assist in providing some of the physical services, the private bar and
the Pro Se Office would be responsible for ensuring that the kiosk is
staffed during the stated hours of operation. Thus, the Pro Se Office
would provide the procedural advice it now provides, and volunteer
attorneys would provide the substantive advice currently unavailable
to pro se litigants.
In the second program, the Pro Se Office and the private bar
accept unofficial statements of the facts prior to officially filing the
complaint with the court. Pro bono attorneys review the statements
and do one of two things, depending on the commitment the attorney
is willing to make. If the attorney is only willing to offer limited
assistance, she could substantively review and discuss the statement
with the litigant. Alternatively, the attorney could accept the case for
representation."' Potential plaintiffs participating in this program
would have to be made aware of any statute of limitations issues and
there should be a maximum number of days a statement can be
pending in the program. If the litigant is not contacted within the set
period of time, the case is automatically withdrawn from the program.
In the third program, bar associations and/or their committees
assume responsibilities for updating the brochures and videos. In
addition, the bar associations (or law school professors) take on the
responsibility of providing the necessary training for court personnel.
Not only would the training include information on substantive and
procedural standards, but it would also be focused on communicating
with and listening to pro se litigants.188 Specifically, the court
185. The New York City Bar Association has established a program to provide the
public with free advice on a limited basis. The program is operated out of the Bar
Association and operates once a week for a couple of hours. For further information
on these programs, see the Bar Associations website, at http://www.abcny.org. (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002).
186. This program is designed to address the disservice the Pro Se Office is
currently forced to serve the litigant and the court. Numerous times, I have seen a
litigant come to the Pro Se Office with a clearly frivolous complaint. Due to the
restriction on giving substantive advice, I was unable to discuss the substance of the
complaint with the litigant, who proceeds to file the action, which is dismissed sua
sponte shortly thereafter.
187. While some attorneys prefer to accept pro bono cases later in the litigation,
this program would allow interested attorneys to be involved before the complaint is
filed.
188. See Brooks, supra note 14, at 12 (quoting Indiana State Court Judge Gregory
J. Donat as stating, "the citizens deal with the person at the front desk, who is usually
a new hire with the least ability to answer their questions.").
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personnel should be trained in speaking with pro se litigants and
dealing with a variety of emotions that may arise.
These programs are designed to work together to reduce the
amount of frivolous complaints filed and sixty-day orders seeking
additional facts. By providing litigants with representation or
assistance prior to the filing of the complaint, the facts would be
clarified and the issues clearly framed. Settling the facts and issues
early in the litigation process would allow the case to run more
smoothly and ensure that the meritorious claims are identified and
given their rightful review.
B. Post-filing and Judicial Review of the Complaint
Once a complaint is filed, it should be routed to the Pro Se Office
for an initial screening prior to the issuance of a docket number and
summons.189 Several attorneys perform the screening after thoroughly
reviewing the factual allegations set forth in the complaint. The
attorneys search for any possible claim that may be made based on
the allegations. The attorneys then make an initial determination as
to whether the facts set forth any claim, whether more information is
needed or whether the case should be dismissed sua sponte. The
focus during the screening process is on factual allegations and not
the litigant's knowledge of legal precedent or the form of the
complaint."9
By screening and, if warranted, dismissing the case prior to issuing
a docket number and summons, the court avoids unnecessarily issuing
a summons, the litigant avoids unnecessarily serving the complaint,
and the defendant avoids unnecessarily drafting an answer. The
screening process should be expeditious because the assistance
mentioned in the first sub-section should produce fewer complaints
overall and more legible and colorable complaints. Furthermore,
time consuming orders and communications, such as sixty-day orders
and amended complaints, should be reduced, as should some easily
identifiable dismissals, such as improper venue.
The Pro Se Office's screening of complaints and drafting of sua
sponte and sixty-day orders should be supervised by a United States
magistrate judge. The magistrate judge would review any order
189. This suggestion proceeds on the assumption that the litigant sought in forma
pauperis status to waive the filing fee. See supra Tbl. IV (finding that 94.9% of pro se
cases were filed with an in forma pauperis application and displaying a modified
version of what is currently practiced in the Southern District of New York).
190. The obvious exception to this is when the pleadings are completely illegible.
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drafted by the Pro Se Office and make a determination as to how, and
if, the case should proceed. Currently, some district courts employ
full-time magistrate judges to oversee pro se litigation.19' While this is
an important step in assisting, expediting, and centralizing pro se
litigation, it is a daunting task for one magistrate judge in a large
district court, such as the Southern District of New York. Instead, I
suggest the drafting of orders be supervised by a panel of magistrate
judges with one magistrate judge serving in the position at all times.
The position could rotate every several months, similar to a
magistrate judge who sits on arraignments, depending on the caseload
of the court. Having a small panel of magistrate judges oversee pro se
litigation centralizes pro se litigation under a few magistrate judges
rather than dispersing it among the fifty district court judges in the
Southern District of New York. The cases that the magistrate judge
would oversee would be any pro se case that was filed in the court
during that judge's tenure as the revolving judge. The sole exception
to this would be repeat filers. As stated in Table XXI, 41% of pro se
litigants had previously filed a complaint in the court. It would be
more expeditious if concise records were maintained detailing the
litigant's prior filings and if any subsequent filing was assigned to the
same magistrate judge. By being familiar with the litigant, the
magistrate judge would be able to avoid any relitigation of issues and
keep a tight rein on the litigant's abuse of the system.
Once the complaint survives a sua sponte review and is issued a
docket number, the Pro Se Office and the private bar can continue to
perform several meaningful tasks. The Pro Se Office could continue
to provide the litigant with useful procedural advice. Similar to the
program set forth above, the private bar could assist pro se litigants
after the filing of the complaint by setting up a kiosk on specific days
to provide substantive advice. This would be a separate function than
that discussed during the complaint phase, although usage of the
space and volunteers could be the same. Not only would the
assistance of private attorneys provide the litigants with a needed
service (i.e., substantive advice) and help the court function more
efficiently, but it would also satisfy some lawyers' desire to perform
pro bono work. In addition, it would provide the volunteer lawyer
with a valuable "hands-on" experience and an introduction to the
191. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York has
recently created a magistrate judge's position to oversee pro se litigation. The Pro
Bono Plan for the Eastern District, available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/
probono/Plan/plan.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
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court.
192
If the private bar is unable to provide substantive advice, then the
Pro Se Office should provide this service. The Pro Se Office could
provide this service by splitting into two distinct parts-one to
provide procedural advice and screen complaints and the other to
provide substantive advice.193 In order to allow the Pro Se Office to
provide substantive advice, the distinction between substantive and
procedural advice would have to be eliminated.' 94 The distinction
between procedural and substantive advice "derives from restrictions
that prohibit clerks from practicing law and require clerks to remain
impartial."' 95 As John Greacen stated in an article entitled, 'No Legal
Advice From Court Personnel' What Does That Mean?, "Giving legal
advice .... has no inherent meaning, or even core meaning, and that
its current use by courts has serious negative consequences for the
ability of courts to provide full and consistent public service."' 96
Greacen goes on to state:
The consequences of a fuzzy definition of "giving legal advice" is to
vest unguided discretion in the deputy clerk to answer what he or
she wishes to answer and feels comfortable answering, and to refuse
to answer any question he or she decides not to answer. The result,
as with all unconstrained discretion, is the potential for abuse,
favoritism, and undesired consequences .... Many [pro se litigants]
192. See M-10-468 (Oct. 1, 1997 S.D.N.Y.). Although somewhat contrary to the
general theory of pro bono services, the Southern District of New York has made it
somewhat more palpable for some attorneys to assist pro bono by setting up a
reimbursement fund for pro bono attorneys, where the maximum reimbursement is
set at $2,000.
193. A magistrate judge could oversee the screening and sua sponte review of
complaints, while a Senior Staff Attorney could oversee the rest of the Pro Se Office.
194. See generally Greacen, supra note 11, at 10-15 (providing a thoughtful
discussion of the use and misuse of the distinction between procedural and
substantive advice).
195. Engler, supra note 7, at 1993 (footnotes omitted); id. at 1992-93 n. 25 (citing In
re Amendments to the Fla. Small Claims Rules, 601 So. 2d 1201, 1216 (Fla. 1992)
("The clerk is not authorized to practice law and therefore cannot give you legal
advice on how to prove your case."); State v. Walters, 411 S.E.2d 688, 691 (W. Va.
1991) (stating that no magistrate clerk may act as an attorney for any party); Standing
Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Servs., Am. Bar Ass'n, Responding to the Needs of
the Self-Represented Divorce Litigant 24-25 (1994) ("[I1t is important that court
clerks not practice law by giving substantive legal advice"); Greacen, supra note 11,
at 10 ("Members shall not give legal advice unless specifically required to do so as
part of their office position.") (quoting THE NAT'L Ass'N FOR CT. MGMT., Model
Code of Conduct art. II(B)).
196. Greacen, supra note 11, at 10; see also Engler supra note 7, at 2036 ("unleash
court clerks") (citation omitted).
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do not trust lawyers, or the legal system, and it is very hard for
deputy clerks to deal with them. They will challenge information
given .... They often demand services the staff does not usually
provide. An easy way to "get rid of" such persons.., is to cut the
questions short with the useful phrase, "I am not allowed to give
legal advice. What you are asking me involves legal advice.
197
Greacen has also noted that the phrase is "an easy way to 'get rid
of' an unrepresented litigant seeking assistance." '198 In my own
practice, I have too often seen this phrase irritate and confuse
litigants, while hampering, rather than assisting, the efficiency of the
court and the litigants' ability to prosecute their cases. Therefore, I
recommend that if the private bar is unable to provide the needed pro
bono substantive advice, as set forth above or in some other capacity,
the distinction between procedural and substantive advice should be
eliminated, and the Pro Se Office should be able to assist litigants
with procedural and substantive advice.1 9
C. Evaluation of Case for Alternative Dispute Resolution
Once a complaint survives a sua sponte review, I recommend that
an early evaluation meeting be held between the litigant and a pro se
staff attorney." The purpose of this meeting is three-fold: (1) to
clarify the litigant's goals in the litigation and to "temper[] the
adversariness of an inherently adversarial situation" ;201 (2) to
introduce the litigant to ADR;212 and (3) to evaluate the suitability of
197. Greacen, supra note 11, at 12; see Engler, supra note 7, at 1994 (quoting staff
attorney in the Western District of Louisiana: "We have been told here ... not to
give 'legal advice' but I have never heard this term defined so I do struggle with what
to tell [pro se litigants] ... because sometimes this can be a fine line.") (citation
omitted).
198. Greacen, supra note 11, at 12.
199. It is somewhat counterintuitive, if not hypocritical and unconstitutional, to
reduce access to legal services, require litigants to comply with strict legal standards
and deny them access to substantive advice. This is particularly true when dismissal
of the complaint is based on technical, yet curable, legal grounds.
200. For obvious reasons, including security and transportation, this program is
only available for non-inmates. An alternative for inmates is discussed below. See
infra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.
201. Morell E. Mullins, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission: Settlement Judges and Simplified Proceedings, 5
ADMIN. L.J. 555, 652 (1991) (discussing pro se proceedings at the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA")). I have found this to be particularly
true in pro se cases.
202. In three years at the Pro Se Office, a pro se litigant has never sought my
advice concerning ADR on her own initiative. Generally, requests for information
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the case for ADR.2 3 By the time the litigant reaches the evaluation
meeting, he has ideally spoken to an attorney at least once in
formulating her complaint, and has had her complaint substantively
reviewed during the sua sponte review process.
As shown in Tables XXIII and XXIV, cases that survive a sua
sponte review are generally pending in the court the longest and have
the most docket entries. Furthermore, as shown in Table XII, pro se
litigants are not adverse to settlement. Settlement was the second
most common disposition, at 14.8% of the cases. While the
previously mentioned programs were designed to address the most
common disposition of pro se cases-sua sponte dismissals-the
programs in this sub-section address the second most common
disposition-settlements and other forms of ADR.
The object of the evaluation meeting is to ascertain whether any of
the cases that survived sua sponte review might be ripe for some form
of early resolution. 4 The evaluation meeting also serves to identify
and articulate any possible claims and defenses that the litigant may
have. If there is a possibility that the case is ripe for ADR, the staff
attorney, with the litigant's consent, could report to the judge or
magistrate judge as to the appropriateness of some form of ADR.2 "5
The judge, as discussed in more detail below, would then be
presented not only with a clearer idea of what the case involves, but
also with the litigant's willingness to pursue ADR. If the case were
not ripe for ADR, then it would simply continue on its normal
course."° The district court judge and magistrate judge would not
have any participation in the evaluation meeting, thereby maintaining
pertaining to ADR originate from the judge or the opposing counsel.
203. Whether the evaluation meeting should be limited to substantive advice or
substantive opinions is left open. Also left open are the specifics on how to conduct
the meeting. Certain time and other restrictions would have to be made clear prior
to the meeting. As there are many litigants, the evaluation meeting must be done in
a manner consistent with the fact that personnel cannot meet with one litigant all day.
I note, however, that the amount of cases that reach this stage is approximately one
quarter-one-half of the cases are inmate-filed cases and many others are dismissed
sua sponte. See infra Tbls. XIII, XIII & XIV.
204. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112
Stat. 2993, 2993-3004 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658. See 28 U.S.C. §
652(a)) (requiring district courts to offer some form of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in all civil actions). But see 28 U.S.C. § 652(b) (allowing each district
court to exempt specific cases or categories of cases from § 652(a)). Several courts
have excluded pro se cases from ADR.
205. In some cases, where appropriate, the judge could order mandatory ADR.
206. All communications during the evaluation meeting would be confidential. See
N.D.N.Y., Local Rules, § X, 83.12-8 (2000).
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the judges' neutrality in future proceedings.
The evaluation meeting also serves to allow the litigant to be heard
by the court and feel as though he has had an opportunity to voice her
concerns. In addition, it identifies and expedites those cases that are
prone to ADR. If the court is quickly made aware of the litigant's
concerns and is able to gauge the feasibility of ADR, the court can
begin the ADR process immediately, saving time and resources.
Because it is often difficult for attorneys to find the time and
resources to accept an entire case pro bono, the following two
recommendations are designed to allow attorneys to assist on a
limited basis and to encourage pro bono participation. The following
recommendations are also designed and tailored to address two of the
most common pro se cases: civil rights and employment
discrimination cases in the context of ADR.
The first program, an employment discrimination mediation
program, has already been instituted in the Southern District of New
York."7 The program begins when the results of the evaluation
meeting indicate that the case is ripe for mediation. A request for
mediation is then made to the parties. Either party has the right to
veto the request for mediation. If both parties consent, then the pro
se litigant is assigned counsel solely for the purposes of mediation.
The program seeks to accomplish several goals. As shown in
Tables XXIII and XXIV, on average, employment discrimination
cases are pending on the court's docket for the longest period of time.
Furthermore, as shown in Table XII, employment discrimination
cases are one of the more likely case categories to be settled and one
of the least likely to be dismissed sua sponte. This program seeks to
address the unique processing of employment discrimination cases by
identifying which cases are open to settlement early in the
proceedings. By quickly identifying cases open to settlement, the
court avoids lengthy motion practice, which opens up additional time
to spend on the cases that will not settle. In addition, the program
introduces the litigant to the possibility of mediation, and may result
in a decision more expeditiously.
207. Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and A Role for Judges in Mediating Their
Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 149 (2001) ("The... [Southern
District of New York] has initiated a new program which offers mediation to pro se
litigants (especially in employment discrimination cases) by helping them to secure
counsel for the mediation proceeding."). Historically, pro se cases were excluded
from the court's mediation program. In order to participate, pro se employment
discrimination cases have started to be assigned counsel solely for the purposes of
mediation, when both parties consent.
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The more effective the sua sponte review of the complaints and the
subsequent evaluation meeting are, the more effective the
employment discrimination mediation program will be. If the Pro Se
Office is able to weed out frivolous complaints, and the evaluation
meeting is able to identify which of the remaining complaints are
suitable for mediation, then resolving these cases expeditiously and
amicably through mediation is a viable option. The evaluation
meeting is vital because if there is no real possibility that the case may
settle, unsuccessful mediation will only absorb, rather than save, the
court's time.
Prior to entering mediation the judge must ensure that the litigant
is willing to participate in the program voluntarily and that the litigant
is knowingly waiving her rights. 8 I also suggest that the judge have
the opportunity to limit the amount of time the case may be
mediated. This will force the parties to push forward with mediation
if they are serious about it. It will allow the case to return
expeditiously to the court's docket if mediation is not working. 9
The mediator in this program must have some experience not only
in mediation, but also in employment discrimination. Furthermore,
the mediator should not be the judge. That way, the mediator is in a
position to expand the repertoire of tools may use to resolve the case.
For example, the mediator is not limited by ex parte communications
and off-the-record discussions. The mediator can also be quite frank
as to the merits of the case without jeopardizing the court's
neutrality."' The mediator should be granted qualified immunity and
should not be able to be called as a witness in future proceedings.
Furthermore, all communications during mediation should be totally
confidential and not admissible at trial or subsequent hearings. In
short, the mediator should have broad-based authority to be creative
in fashioning a resolution for the case, including terminating
mediation at any time.
208. See generally Engler, supra note 7, at 2033 n.214 (citing Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671
(1986)) ("expressing concern that ADR may 'result in an abandonment of our
constitutional system in which the 'rule of law' is created and principally enforced
by ... government."').
209. The judge could extend the time limitation upon request of the parties and/or
the mediator. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation and Collective Action,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 604 (explaining that after an unsuccessful mediation, the
case will continue with more formal regulatory measures).
210. Whether the mediators' role should be to evaluate or to facilitate, and how
frank they should be, is a disputed topic that I leave open.
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As for civil rights cases, I present two programs for discussion. As
shown in Tables II and XII, the majority of civil rights complaints
were filed by inmates and were dismissed sua' sponte. While sua
sponte dismissal of civil rights complaints were pending the least
amount of time on the court's docket, those not dismissed sua sponte
were pending the longest.
As shown in Table XII, 312 of the 451 civil rights cases were
dismissed sua sponte. Of the 139 that were not dismissed sua sponte,
fifty-two were pending on the court's docket, sixteen were voluntarily
dismissed, and three were decided by jury verdicts for the defendants.
The remaining sixty-eight were split, with almost half being settled
and half being dismissed on a motion to dismiss or summary
judgment. The following final two programs address these sixty-eight
cases.
21
'
In the first program, the court could hold hearings at prison
facilities to expedite the proceedings and save time, money, and
resources. 212  Essentially, the program would require a magistrate
judge, possibly the rotating pro se magistrate judge discussed above,
to spend one day in a particular facility holding pre-trial and other
hearings. The court would save time and money by holding all the
hearings in one day. The court could also order mandatory discovery
to occur during the hearing.213 Providing the litigant with mandatory
discovery before the judge would reduce discovery issues, in
particular, disputes over whether the litigant actually received the
discovery.2 14  Furthermore, the litigant would have a better
understanding of the procedures because hearings such as these,
which are often done by telephonic conference, often leave the
litigant with numerous open questions that the judge would be able to
clarify immediately. This program would also save the defense
attorney time and money by requiring him to be in one place at one
time to argue several cases. As shown in Table II, the defendant is
211. The program also indirectly addresses the majority of the fifty-two pending
cases, which will either be settled or dismissed on motion. See supra Tbl. XII.
212. The Southern District of New York has jurisdiction over numerous state
facilities in eight counties. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2000). Based on my experience,
the majority of the inmate cases come from two of these facilities-Sing Sing
Correctional Facility and Green Haven Correctional Facility. A pilot program could
begin with these two facilities and then spread to other facilities depending on the
need.
213. See infra Part III.D, for a discussion of mandatory discovery.
214. Based on my own observations at the Pro Se Office, one of the most common
inmate complaints during litigation is that the facility mail service is tampering with
the inmate's mail and denying them discovery.
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almost always a government defendant and therefore, the attorney
general of the State. It would also save the State time and money by
reducing the costs associated with transporting defendants from
prisons to the courthouse.
As previously discussed, prisoner complaints would be unsuitable
for the ADR program as laid out above. Therefore, identifying the
prisoner complaints that are suitable for ADR is the focus of the
second program. This could be done in a three-step process that
requires relatively little time and resources, but which carefully
considers the litigants' claims. First, the Pro Se Office could mail a
carefully drafted questionnaire focusing on the facts, requested relief,
and the litigant's willingness to pursue ADR to each inmate whose
complaint survives a sua sponte review. Depending on the litigant's
responses to the questionnaire, the judge could recommend the
second step, having the prisoner appear before the magistrate judge
holding hearings at the facility. The magistrate judge could then
make a full assessment of the case and its suitability for ADR.
Furthermore, the magistrate judge could verify the litigant's
willingness to pursue ADR. If the magistrate judge finds that the
case is suitable for ADR and both parties agree, then the magistrate
judge could hold an ADR conference-the third step.
The third step in the prisoner ADR program could be designed to
mirror the employment discrimination meditation program. As
shown in Table X, the majority of pro bono counsels assigned by the
court accepted civil rights cases. The court could foster this by
requesting pro bono counsel in prisoner cases to be appointed solely
for the purposes of mediation in prisoner cases."5 Assigned counsel
could accompany the magistrate judge to the facility and could
mediate several cases in one day.2"6
D. Discovery Process
If the case is not resolved through ADR and once the complaint
has been served, the case will enter the discovery period. As stated in
215. The attorney would be required to prepare prior to the assigned day of
mediation.
216. A similar program that should also be open to discussion is a program loosely
based on the Northern District of New York's Early Neutral Evaluation. See
N.D.N.Y., Local Rules, § X, 83.12-1 to -10 (2000). In the Early Neutral Evaluation
program "parties obtain from an experienced neutral [evaluator] ... a nonbinding,
reasoned, oral evaluation of the merits of the case." Id. § X, 83.12-1. In pro se cases,
statements of the case could be submitted to an evaluator who would then evaluate
the possibilities of settlement and the overall value of the case.
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Table VII, discovery motions were the second most frequently filed
motions in pro se cases. Discovery, while generally performed
between the parties, is one of the principal reasons pro se cases
absorb a considerable amount of the court's resources. In order to
reduce the amount of motions filed and court involvement in
discovery, I suggest implementing automatic, standardized
discovery.217 This would simplify the proceedings and minimize court
involvement. Based on a pro se litigant's minimal knowledge of the
proceedings and inability to concisely formulate discovery requests, I
suggest that represented parties affirmatively seek protective orders
when they object to any required discovery. The alternative, forcing
pro se litigants to file motions to compel, would only revert back to
the current system and increase the amount of time and resources the
court spends on discovery. Rather than having the litigant file a
myriad of motions to get several documents, the defendants would be
required to file one motion containing all discovery issues in dispute.
I also suggest that the magistrate judge hold a discovery conference
informing both parties of their obligations under the mandatory
discovery rules. At the conference the magistrate judge should
clearly inform the pro se litigant not only of her rights under the
mandatory discovery rules, but also her obligations. In addition, the
Pro Se Office or the private bar should draft clear written instructions
detailing the litigant's rights and obligations under the mandatory
discovery rules. Alternatively, if mandatory discovery is not possible,
I suggest the Pro Se Office compile standard interrogatories and
document request forms to make available to pro se litigants. 218
E. Judicial Intervention
The following suggestions, pertaining to the judge's role in
adjudicating pro se cases, are consistent with the above theory that a
pro se litigant's rights are better protected when pro bono counsel
represents her. However, if counsel is not available, the judge is
placed in a position where she must employ several mechanisms to
ensure that the litigant's rights are protected, while not sacrificing her
217. Although on December 1, 2000, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended to include mandatory disclosure without an opt-out option, see FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(1), there are several exceptions. Two of those exceptions are habeas corpus
petitions, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E)(ii), and "an action brought without counsel by
a person in custody of the United States, a state, or a state subdivision." FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(1)(E)(iii).
218. The court could also take initiative by ordering automatic discovery.
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neutral position. In order to assist the judge in this task, I suggest that
uniform procedures or recommendations to judges on managing pro
se cases be drafted."9 I recommend that the private bar, the Pro Se
Office and members of the judiciary join together to draft
recommendations to judges on dealing with pro se issues. Some of
these recommendations should include an increased judicial role in
pro se cases.
One increased role the judge could play pertains to the evaluation
of the case for ADR. As shown in Table XII, the second most
frequent resolution of pro se cases is through settlement. Judges
could expedite the settlement process by reviewing the report from
the evaluation meeting and determining whether the case is ripe for
settlement or some other form of ADR. If the judge decides that the
case is a candidate for ADR, than the judge should take an active role
in eliciting facts, claims, and defenses from the litigant that were not
already identified during the evaluation meeting."' Eliciting the
litigant's arguments is critical because as stated above, pro se cases
that received legal assistance are six times more likely to settle than
those without legal assistance."' In addition, it would provide a
quicker resolution to those cases prone to ADR.
Next, judges should familiarize themselves with pro se forms and
be relaxed about any deficiencies in the complaints that can be easily
overcome.222 Again, this would primarily be necessary if some of the
programs stated above that provide the litigant with legal assistance
do not come to fruition. In addition, judges, like Pro Se Office
employees, should be educated in dealing with pro se litigants.
Judges should be clear with the litigants in what the court expects and
why things are done in a particular manner.223
219. Ninety-one percent of judges in a prior survey stated that "their courts had no
general policy addressing the manner in which pro se litigants should be handled in
the courtroom or in the litigation process generally." Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at
19.
220. Engler, supra note 7, at 2029.
221. See supra Part II.B.7.
222. See generally COMM'N ON TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURT AND THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS WITH COMMENTARY (1990),
Standard 1 ("Trial courts should be open and accessible .... Accessibility is required
not only for those who are guided by an attorney but also for all litigants .... ); id. at
Standard 1.3 ("All who appear before the court are given the opportunity to
participate effectively without undue hardship or inconvenience.").
223. The court should also look into establishing connections with City and State
social service agencies. The agencies, which may operate out of the court, could
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If the litigant is unable to get assistance from other sources, the
judge should not be prohibited from making suggestions as to how
the case should move forward. In particular, judges should feel free
to recommend ways in which litigants can obtain legal representation.
The judges and the court should be more active in establishing
initiatives with the bar and law schools to seek legal representation
for pro se litigants. As shown in Tables IX and X, only 3.1% of pro se
cases actually received legal assistance through the court. 24
Furthermore, the Southern District of New York currently has fifty-
six cases pending where applications for counsel were granted, but no
counsel has yet been assigned.225 Judges should make it more
attractive to assist pro bono by making special accommodations for
attorneys representing parties pro bono.226  For example, one
suggestion has been to "give priority at calendar or docket calls to
volunteer lawyers... [L]awyers take cases knowing that their days
will not be spent waiting for a case to be called., 227 Furthermore, the
court should attempt to set up a dialogue with and among the
attorneys. In particular, the court should solicit information as to the
best methods to promote pro bono activities and to share relevant
information among the attorneys.
The court should also work with law school clinics in an effort to
provide pro bono counsel. Periodically, in the Southern District of
New York, the Pro Se Office has a clinic seeking to assist a pro se
litigant. There is not, however, a systematic program designed to
assist the litigant on difficult social issues that often arise in pro se cases.
224. As shown in Tbl. X, more pro se litigants were able to receive counsel on their
own than through the court.
225. General data on pro se cases collected by the Pro Se Office for the years 1995-
1999.
226. While this article is primarily focused on the court's role in pro se litigation,
there is no question the private bar must also take an initiative to promote pro bono
counsel. See Steven C. Krane, Re-Focus on Pro Bono and Bar Activities, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 9, 2001, at S7 (reporting that President-elect of New York State Bar Association
argues for more pro bono activity on behalf of lawyers). As shown in Tbl. X, only
21.5% of applications were granted. If the screening process and evaluation meeting
are established as set forth above, frivolous complaints will get weeded out prior to
the filing of an application for counsel and presumably those cases that did make it
through the process will have at least some merit. Therefore, it is also possible that
the application process for the assignment of pro bono counsel could be relaxed. The
court could inject some payment scale in which litigants who can pay some amount
towards pro bono counsel do so. The system could be set-up on a sliding scale based
on the litigant's financial situation.
227. Robert M. Paolini, Pro Bono Is Better Than Pro Se, 24 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 7, 7
(1998).
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encourage or ensure that law schools enter the court with the
intention of assisting a pro se litigant on a regular basis."'
. As to the bar associations, they could promote pro bono activity by
providing accolades for and recognition of those who perform pro
bono activity by printing pro bono services in a bar association or
court-run publication.2 9 This may also improve the public's image of
the profession and give accolades where they are due. 3°
None of the above suggestions would run contrary to the judge's
and the court's duty of impartiality. It has been said that a "court
may need to provide more help to one side than to the other to
maintain the impartiality of the proceedings." '231 The argument is that
a pro se party is at such a disadvantage 32 when opposing a
represented party that judicial intervention may be warranted to
maintain a level playing field. 33
CONCLUSION
The challenges presented by pro se litigation are as profound as
they are real and regular. In this time of ever increasing legal costs
and complexity of litigation, the pro se litigant is at an
insurmountable disadvantage. Even the most eager and intelligent
layperson cannot be expected to learn and understand procedural and
substantive law in a short amount of time. As more and more
litigants turn pro se, courts around the country must fashion methods
to protect the fundamental constitutional rights of pro se litigants and
to ensure that each litigant gets "his day in court. 2 34
228. For a discussion on pro se law school clinics, see Barry, supra note 173, at
1926.
229. Paolini, supra note 227, at 7.
230. Id.
231. Engler, supra note 7, at 2023 n.171 (citing Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology,
and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 321 n.96 (1989) ("A
judge can be impartial but very active in developing the case.... Impartiality is a
requirement for fair adjudication, but judicial passivity is not.")).
232. See supra Tbl. XII and accompanying text (finding that excluding settled cases
not a single pro se litigants in 652 pro se litigants was victorious).
233. See Engler, supra note 7, at 2022-23.
234. See Moore v. Price, 914 S.W.2d 318, 323 (Ark. 1996) (Mayfield, J., dissenting).
Lest the citizenry lose faith in the substance of the system and the
procedures we use to administer it, we can ill afford to confront them with a
government dominated by forms and mysterious rituals and then tell them
they lose because they did not know how to play the game or should not
have taken us at our word.
Id. (Mayfield, J., dissenting).
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Experiencing first hand the frustrations and difficulties pro se
litigants encounter on a daily basis, I began to look into what, if
anything, other courts and court staff have done to alleviate the
pressures of pro se litigation. I quickly discovered that there was very
little information or guides on pro se litigation. I, therefore, sought to
develop some usable research to examine who files pro se and under
what circumstances. While the Study is by no means exhaustive, it
reveals that pro se litigation is complex and diverse in both its subject
matter and procedural history. To address these complexities I
suggest several methods to maximize the court's resources and to
provide the pro se litigant with a "level playing field." The
suggestions attempt to strike a balance between encouraging pro se
litigation and increasing the efficiency of the courts. The suggestions
are also meant to initiate a dialogue and to promote each district
court to fashion a pro se program that best suits its specific docket.
Finally, pro se litigants are often described as "pest[s]," "nut[s],"
''an increasing problem," "clogging our judicial system," and "no one
likes [them]." '235 However, they are not only entitled to their
constitutional rights, they are also not going away. The judicial
system cannot afford to alienate almost one-fourth of its caseload,
and must be prepared to handle the increase of pro se cases. In light
of the absence of legal services, the burden to protect pro se litigants'
rights falls on the court. The court, however, cannot and should not
do it alone. Members of the bar, bar associations and law schools
must assist the courts in taking the lead to address pro se litigation.
This Article suggests some methods in which they can assist, whether
they choose to do so and in what capacity is unclear. What is clear is
that pro se litigation is and will continue to be an integral and growing
part of the judicial system.
235. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 2, at 121 (quoting state court judges).
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APPENDIX
1. TYPE OF CASE
TYPE OF CASE
Civil Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Family Divers. FOIA Labor Others TOTALS
Rights Discrim.
1995 123 36 9 2 1 4 I 0 8 184
1996 109 28 19 0 1 1 1 5 10 174
1997 71 28 24 1 1 0 0 l 12 138
1998 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126
1999 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143
TOTALS 451 136 93 6 3 1 8 4 10 54 765
2. PARTIES
. .. _PARTjE,-1995 CASES
Civ Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS InmateDiscrim. Filing
Multiple 4Mutpe 4 1at 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1lat 2 6 4
Plaintiffs (ave. 3.5)
Multiple 102 13 2 2 0 1 at 2 0 0 4 124 99
Defendants (ave. 5) (ave. 4) (ave. 2) (ave. 2.5) (ave. 5) (ave. 5.1)
Government 118 17 9 0 0 1 1 0 5 151 115
Defendant
Inmate Plaintiff 117 0 0 0 0 I 1 0 3 122 122
TOTAL CASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 1 0 8 184 122
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PARTS-1998 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. 0th. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Multiple 2 1 at 2 3 1 at 2
Plaintiffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (ave. 2)
Multiple 52 5 1 at 7 0 0 0 1 at 6 3 4 66 45
Defendants (ave. 7.9) (ave. 2.8) (ave, 6.3) (ave. 5.3) (ave. 8.1)
Government 59 7 27 0 0 0 1 2 6 102 55
Defendant
54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 56 56
Plaintiff
TOTAL CASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
PARTIES-1999 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Multiple 2 2
Plaintiffs (ave. 5) 1at2 0 1at2 0 0 0 0 0 (ave. 5)
Multiple 69 6 I at 2 2 0 1 at 3 1 at 2 0 9 89 58
Defendants (ave. 8) (ave, 7.7) (ave. 14.5) (ave. 4.1) (ave. 7.4)
Govermnt 77 8 14 1 0 0 1 0 8 109 61
Defendant
Inmate 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 68
Plaintiff
TOTAL CASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
3. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
IN FORMA PA UPERIS APPLICATION-1995 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Request 121 32 7 2 I 4 1 0 8 176 120
for IFP
Granted 121 31 7 2 1 3 1 0 8 174 120
Denied 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 2 0
TOTALCASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 I 0 8 184 122
IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION-1996 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrimt. Sec. Filing
Reqaest 107 25 18 0 1 1 1 5 8 166 101
for IFP
Granted 107 25 18 0 1 1 1 5 8 166 101
Denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL CASES 1109 28 19 0 t I I 5 0 174 101
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Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fai. Divers FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim, Sec. Filing
Request 68 25 24 1 1 0 0 1 11 130 58
for 1FP
Granted 68 25 24 1 1 0 0 1 11 130 58
Denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 1 1 0 0 1 12 138 61
INFORMA PA RSAPPLICVf ONL1998 CASE
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. 0th. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Request 62 18 27 0 0 1 1 3 9 121 56
for 1FP
Granted 62 18 27 0 0 1 1 3 9 121 56
Denied 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTALCASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
I.N FORM A PAULPERi~s APPLICATON-1999 CA~S I
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Far. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Request 83 20 13 3 0 1 1 0 11 132 67
for 1FP
Granted 82 19 13 3 0 1 1 0 11 130 67
Denied I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
TOTALCASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
4. TYPE OF REMEDY SOUGHT
TYPE~ 0F REMEDY SOUGIT-1995 CASES,-
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. th. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrii. Sec. Filing
Monetary Only 72 28 8 1 0 4 0 0 4 117 72
Equitable Only 6 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 13 8
Monetary and 45 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 54 42
Equitable
TOTALCASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 1 0 8 184 122
Ci. TYPE OF REMEDY SOUG4 i- t996 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Hoes Fain Divers. FOIA Lab. th TOTALS Filing
Monetary Only 78 24 19 0 0 1 0 1 6 129 70
Equitable Only 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2
Monetary and 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 43 29
Equitable 30
TOTALCASES 109 28 19 0 1 1 1 5 10 174 101
IN FORMA PAuIpERS APPLICATION-1997 lCAE
385
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TYPE OF REMEDY SOUGHT-1997 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Monetary Only 36 20 24 0 0 0 0 1 8 89 28
Equitable Only 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 6 2
Monetary and 33 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 43 31
Equitable
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 I 0 0 1 12 138 61
TYPE OF REMEDY SOUGHT-1998 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Hous Fain Divers FOIA Lab 0th TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Sec. Filing
Monetary Only 41 18 27 0 0 1 0 2 5 94 38
Equitable Only 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Monetary and 21 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 31 18
Equitable
TOTAL CASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
TYPE OF REMEDY Souma-1999 CASES
Civ. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hoes. Fain Divers FO1A Lab Oih TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Filing
Monetary Only 59 19 14 0 0 2 0 0 7 101 53
Equitable Only I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 5 1
Monetary and 26 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 37 14
Equitable
TOTAL CASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
5. DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE COURT
.. .... . FmINGS-1995 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS InmateDiscrim. Filing
OSC 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4
60-day Order 22 5 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 22
Amend. Com. 21 8 I 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 21
Extension of
TimeRequest 8 8 I 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 8
M/TID or S.J. 18 20 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 17
Discov. Mot. 19 13 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 35 19
Default 5 1 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 7 5
Judgment
Motion for 5 4 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 t0 4
Recon.
TOTAL CASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 1 0 8 184 122
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FILINGS-1996 CAS ..s
Amend. Com. 17 9 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 29 16
Extension oft est 19 5 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 18Time Request
M/T/D or S.J. 23 14 12 0 0 1 0 1 1 52 23
Discov. Mot. 23 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 38 21
Default
Judgment
Motion for
Recon.
TOTAL CASES 109 28 19 0 1 1 1 5 10 174 101
TFILUNGS-1997 CASE
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec Hous. Fam. Dives Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. Filing
OSC 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3
60-day Order 14 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 20 12
Amend. Com. 11 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 23 8
Extension of
TimeRequest 6 8 20 0 0 0 0 0 1 35 5
M/T/D or S.J. 13 10 16 0 0 0 0 1 3 43 10
Discov. Mot. 14 16 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 36 12
Default
J I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0Judgment
Motion for 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 2
Recon.
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 1 0 0 t 12 138 61
EimoyI InmatenGin Right. mploy. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
OSC 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 2
60-day Order 10 3 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 19 7
Amend. Com. 14 5 4 0 0 1 0 2 2 28 12
Extension of
Tioeequest 15 4 25 0 0 0 0 I 4 49 16
MiT/D or S.J. 8 8 9 0 0 0 0 4 2 31 7
Discov. Mot. 18 12 5 0 0 0 0 2 2 39 18
Default 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2Judgment
Motion foe 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 3Recon.
TOTAL CASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
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FILINGS-1999 CASES
Amend. Com. 24 6 I 2 0 0 0 0 1 34 21
Extension oft est 15 3 11 0 0 0 I 0 I 31 12Time Request
M/T/D or S.J. 14 9 2 0 0 0 1 0 I 27 13
Discov. Mot. 18 5 2 I 0 0 0 0 2 28 17
Default 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Judgment
Motion for 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Recon.
TOTAL CASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
6. FILING AND DISPOSITION OF REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL-1995 CASES
CvRih.Employ. InmateCiv. Right. . Soc. See. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS F1.8Discerim. . iling
Requested 18 14 2 0 I 2 0 0 1 38 18
Denied 10 13 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 27 10
Granted 8 1 0 0 I 1 0 0 0 II 8
Appearance 7-W; 0 0 0 1 -W; 0 0 0 9 -w; 6 - w;
Made 1 - W/o 3 - w/o 0 0 -wO 0 0 0 0 4 - w/O I -W/o
TOTALCASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 I 0 8 184 122
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL-1996 CASES
Employ. Inmate
Civ. Right, Smploy' oc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Filing
Requested 25 14 1 0 0 0 0 1 I 42 24
Denied 21 9 I 0 0 0 0 1 I 33 20
Granted 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 4
Appearance 3W; 4-w; 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 -w; 3 - W;
Made 2-W/o I -W/o 5-w/o 0 0 0 0 0 I - W/O 9 -W/O 2-wo
TOTALCASES 109 28 19 0 1 1 1 5 10 174 101
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL-1997 CASES
Right Employ. Soc. Sec, Hous. Fam. Divers, FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Ci. Discrm. Filing
Requested 14 14 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 34 12
Denied 11 12 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 27 9
Granted 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3
Appearance l- W; 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 - W; 0
Made 0 6-W/o 3-W/O 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 - W/O I -W/O
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 1 I 0 0 1 12 138 61
2002] IMPROVING PRO SE CASES-APPENDIX
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL-1999 CASES
Cir. Right. Employ. Soc. Hous. Faio. Divers. FOIA Lab, Oth. TOTALS lnateDiscrim. Sec. Filing
Requested 18 5 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 28 17
Denied 15 5 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 24 14
Granted 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3
Appearance I - W; 0 1 -0w; 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 - W; I -w;
Made 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL CASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
7. FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
FINAL DISPosITIoN-1995 CASES
Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous, Far. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate FilingivRih. Discfim I
SaaSponte 90 11 5 2 0 2 1 0 7 119 89
Dismissed
Dismissed on 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 9
MJT/D or S.J. (2 with attn.)
Volntary 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 9 6
Dismissal
endant Trial (I with 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
Verdict attn.) (I with attn.)
Plaintiff Trial
Verdict (default for 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I (default forplaintiff) plaintiff)
2 II11 (1 ~~at ( yat.
Settlement (6 by attn.) 7 0 0 1 10,000 0 0 0 21
($6,808 ave. (I with attn.) with ($7,768 ave.
of5 known) attn.) of 6 known)
Remand to 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Agency
Still Pending 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
TOTAL CASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 I 0 8 184 122
FINAL DISPOSITION-1996 CAES.
Civ. Right. Employ ec. Hous. Farn. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate FilingDiscrim.I II I
SuaSponte 78 6 4 0 1 0 1 4 8 102 73
Dismissed
7
Dismissed on I I (I with I
M/T/D or S.J. 13 (1 with attn.) attn.; 1 0 0 1 0 1 (with 34 12
remand; I attn.)
for plaintiff)
Volantary 3 2 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2
Dismissal
Defendant Trial I 0t0)0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict (with attn.) (with attn.)
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FINAL DIsPosrToN-1996 CASES
Plaintiff Trial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict
62 8 (all remands I
(4with (I by attn.) - I with (4 with attn.)
Settlement atm) (ave. of 4 $4,700 0 0 0 0 0 1 27 ($7,551.67
($6,544.29 known costs) ave. of 6
ave. of7 $13,625) (2 with known)
known) attn.)
Remand to 7
0 0 (2 with 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0
Agency attn.)
Still Pending 2 (with atm) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2
TOTALCASES 109 28 19 0 I I I 5 t0 174 101
FINAL DIsPosITIoN-1997 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS InmaeDiscrim. Filing
SaSpasti 56 6 7 I 1 0 0 0 7 78 45
Dismissed
6
Dismissed on I4 (2 with 0 0 0 0 I 2 24 4M/T/D or S.J. attn.) (5 remands)
Voluntary 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2
Dismissal
DefendantTrial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict
Plainttff Trial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict
5 9
(I with attn.) (I with 6
Settlement ($5,333.33 attn * 0 0 0 0 0 2 22 6
ave. of 3 $45,0000of 21(6 mands)
known) known)
Remand to 0 0 I1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agency
4
(I with atm.) 5
Still Pending (ave. 1235 (ave. 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 4days; 47.7 days; 24.6
entries) entries)
TOTAL CASLS 71 28 24 1 I 0 0 1 12 138 61
FINAL DIsPosmoN-1998 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fatr. Divers. FOIA Lab. th. TOTALS InmateDiiSrim.Filing
Sanponte 38 6 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 53 30
Dismissed
Dismissed on5 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 13 3M/T/D or S.J. (2 remands)
Volantary 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 4
Dismissal
DefendantTrial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict
Plaintiff Trial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict
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__FINAL DISPOSITON-1998 C S,'
5 20 26($15320 ave ($4,000 of I (19- ($1,650. 8$10,543.
Settlement 4known) tInow)(- remands; 1 0 0 0 0 0 80ave. 33 0ave. of
transfr by atn.;01ave. kof 6
(1 with attn.) attn.) transfer) known)
Remand to
0 0 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agency
81
(ave. 705.9 (ave 780 1
Still Pending days; 21.6 d (690 days; 0 0 0 0 0 (705 21 11
entries; I ay;30.4 1 entres) days; 12
attn.) entries) entries)
TOTAL CASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
FINAL DISPIOSITION-1999 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. So. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. R S Sec.IFiling
Snaponte 49 7 2 1 0 2 0 0 12 73 34
Dismissed
Dismissed on 1
MIT/D or S.J. (remand) 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 4
Voluntaty 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 I
Dismissal
Defendant Trial0 000edt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdtct
Plaintiff TrialPlint 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verdict
8
Settlement I with attn. 1 (7 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 with attn.
remands)
Remand to 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agency
31 9 3 2
(ave 3795 (ave. 375 (ave. 490 (ave. 
(ave. 29
Still Pending a 457.5 0 0 0 0 412.5 days; 47 (ave. 383.3days; 14.5 days; 14.2 days; 9 days 95 19.5 days; 14.5
entries) entries) entries) enites) entries) entries)
TOTAL CASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
8. REASON FOR DISMISSAL
REASON FOR DIsMSSAL-1995 CASFS
Civ. Right Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate FilingDiscrtm.
Failure to Serve 10 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 8
Failure to Statealaim 29 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 45 32Claim
Statute of
1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1
Limitations
Subject Matter 7 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 11 4
Jurisdiction
Failure to
Respond to 60- 10 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 10
day Order
Failhre toFreto 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0IFProsecute II I I J 0 1 1
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REASON FOR DISMISSAL-1995 CASES
Transfer 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 1 17 16
(venue)
Immunity I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 10
Neitzke or 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
Duplicate 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Noatate 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
Actor
Exhaustion 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 I 6 0
PersonalInv l 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5Involvement 5
Res Judicata 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0
M-120 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
TOTAL CASES 100 26 8 2 0 2 1 0 7 146 98
REASON FOR DismissAL-1996 CASES
Employ. Soc. Sec Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate Filing
Failure to Serve 6 1 0. 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5
Failure to State a 23Cli 6;S2) 4 6 0 0 0 1 3 2 39 21Claim (6 H; 5 S; 2 E)
Statute of
3 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 3
Limitations
Subject Matter 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 9 4
Jurisdiction
Failure to
Respond to 60- 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
day Order
Failure toFrete 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 t0 3ProsecuteIII I
Transfer 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 8
(venue)
Immunity 3 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 2
Ncitzk or 19 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 23 14
Denton
Duplicate I 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2
Notatate t0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 9
Actor
Exhaustion 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 4
PersonalIn l 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5Involvement 5
Res Judicata 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M-120 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total Cases 91 17 11 0 I 1 I 5 9 136 83
REASON FOR DIsMISSAL-1997 CASES
Civ. Right, Employ, Soc. Sec, Hous. Far. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate Filing
DisFcrim.
Failure to Serve 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 4
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REASON FORi ISSissAL-1997 CASES
7 6Failure to State 76Falat ( Y H; 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 (1 Y; 1 H; I
aClaim 1E) E)
Statute of
7 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 2
Limitations
Subject Matter 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 7 1
Jurisdiction
Failure to
Respond to 60- 9 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 9
day Order
Failure toPrete 4 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 3Prosecute
Transfer 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 14 10
(venue)
Immunity 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
Neitzke or 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 5 3
Denton
Duplicate 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
Notatate 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Actor
Exhaustion 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
PersonalInv l 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1Involvement
Res Judicata 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M-120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conclusory 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Moot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
TOTAL CASES 60 12 18 1 1 0 0 1 9 102 49
REASON FOR DflI%,SSsAL-1998 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrin. Filing
Failure to Serve 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6
Failure to State a 7 6
Claim (2 H; I M) (2 H; I M)
Statute of
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1
Limitations
Subject Matter 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 1
Jurisdiction
Failure to
Respond to 60- 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2
day Order
Failure toPrete 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3Prosecute
Transfer 7 1 - by att. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 6
(venue)
Immunity 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
Neitzke or 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
Denton
Duplicate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Notutate 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
Actor
Exhaustion 2 - FTCA 0 I 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0
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REASON FOR DIsMISSAL-1999 CASES
CvRih.Employ' .c.S InmateCiv. Right. S.oc. Sec. Hous. Famn. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS FilingDiscrim. ili
Failure to Serve 2 2 -" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2
9 8Failure to Statea 98Claim 2 H; 2 E; I 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 14 (2 H; 2 E;
C S) I S)
Statute of
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2Limitations
Subject Matter 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 3"
Jurisdiction
Failure to
Respond to 60- 7 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 12 6
day Order
Failure toPoeue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Prosecute
TransferTranser 6 1 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 8 3(venue)
Immunity 6 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 2 9 2
Neitzke or
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 2
Duplicate 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3
Not a StateAtota 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 4
Actor
Moot 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Exhaustion 2 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1
Res Judicata 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
TOTALCASES 53 12 3 I 0 2 1 0 12 84 37
9. APPEALS
APPEALs-1995 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ, Soc. Sec. Hous. Fan. Divers. FOIA Lab. 0th. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. Filing
Appeal filed 14 9 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 29 13
Appeal denied 13 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 27 12
Appeal granted 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Appeal pending I1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
IFP requested 12 7 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 25 12
Motion for
recongranted 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
TOTAL CASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 1 0 8 184 122
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APPEALS-1996 CASES
Civ Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fan, Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. u1 Filing
Appeal filed 17 5 1 0 0 1 1 3 5 33 14
Appeal denied 16 4 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 30 13
Appeal granted I I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
Appeal pending 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IFP requested 14 4 I 0 0 1 I 3 4 28 12
Motion forreconr 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 recon, grantedI
TOTALCASES 109 28 19 0 1 1 1 5 10 174 101
APPEALS-1997 CASES '
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. Filing
Appeal filed 11 4 3 0 1 0 0 0 2 21 7
Appeal denied 9 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 18 6
Appeal granted 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Appeal pending 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
IFP requested 7 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 7
Motion for 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 I
recon. granted
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 1 1 0 0 1 12 138 61
APPEALS-1998 CAES _
Civ. Right. Employ, Soc. Sec. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS InmateDiscrim. IFiling
Appeal filed 13 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 22 10
Appeal denied 12 3 3 0 0 0 0 I 2 21 10
Appeal granted 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Appeal pending 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IFP requested 9 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 18 9
Motion forrecon r 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1recon, grantedI
TOTALCASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
APPEALS-1999 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fai Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. Filing
Appeal filed 11 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 19 9
Appeal denied 11 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 19 9
Appeal granted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appeal pending 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IFP requested 9 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 7
Motion forrecon I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
recon granted
TOTAL CASES 86 23 t 1.4 3 0 12 1 0 14 143 68
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10. PRIOR CASE FILINGS IN THE COURT
[Vol. XXX
PMOR CASE FILINGS-1995 CASES
C.Rih.Employ. Inmate
Civ. Right. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fain. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALSDiscrim. Filing
Plaintiffs with
priorcomplaiats 60 12 2 0 1 1 0, 0 6 82 58
Average of 5.35 7.25 3 0 3 2 0 0 2.67 5.3 5.48
priors
Bar orders 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 8
Bar warnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Average of
complaints filed 3 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 3.25
after bar order
TOTAL CASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 1 0 8 184 122
POR CASE FIuNGs-1996 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ' Soc. Sec. Hous. Pam Diver FOIA Lab 0th. TOTALS InmateDiscrim. Filing
Plaintiffs with
prior complaints 55 8 3 0 0 I 0 3 7 77 51
Average of 4.53 1.63 11.67 0 0 4 0 1.33 2 4.15 4.59priors
Bar orders 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 6
Bar warnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average of
complaints filed 3.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.67 5.33
after bar order
TOTAL CASES 109 28 19 0 1 1 1 S 10 174 101
PMOR CASE FILJNGS--1997 CASES
Civ. Employ Soc. Sec. Hous. Farn. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Filing
Plaintiffs with 4 1 0 0 0 0 6 56 32
prior complaints 40
Average of priors 5.18 1.5 2.5 1 0 0 0 0 2.67 4.29 2.27
Bar orders 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 3
Bar warnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average of
complaints filed 1.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.11 1.67
after bar order
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 1 1 0 0 1 12 138 61
PRIOR CASE FILINGS-1998 CASES
Civ. Employ, Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Filing
Plaintiffs with
priorcomplaints 36 8 4 0 0 0 0 2 7 57 31
Average of priors 5 1.75 5.5 0 0 0 0 2.5 3.71 4.33 3.77
Bar orders 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Bar warnings 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0
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PRIR CASE FILNGS-199 CASES
Average of
complaints filed 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .67 2
after bar order
TOTAL CASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
PRIOR ___P:ALINS-1994 CASE
Civ. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Filing
Plaintiffs with
prior complaints
Average of priors 6.93 12.67 2.67 3 0 0 1 0 16.25 8.5 3.77
Bar orders 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 2
Bar warnings 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 4
Average of
complaints filed 4.43 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 6. 4.64 1
after bar order
TOTALCASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
11. BURDEN ON COURT
.U.D..ON COURT-19....S
Civ. Employ. Soc. Sec Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Right. Discrim. Filing
Days pending in 157.36 357.72 159 260 0 135 70 0 128.33 146.26
sua sponte dis.
Days pending for 575.90 587.50 500 300 320 960 0 0 100 592.18
others
Days peeding 1235 953.33 0 0 0 1670 0 0 0 1452.5
wvith app. coansel
Docket enies in 7.07 16.36 8.17 6 0 10 6 0 7.5 6.60
sua sponte dis.
Docket entriesfoketers 29.66 27.24 17 7 35 26 0 0 6 29.15
for others
Docket entriesDctb cnee 53.17 39 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 53.17with app. counsel
Cases 45 8 0 0 0 1 37
correspond. with (1.64 ave.) (ave. 1) (ave. 1) 0 0 0 (2.19 ave.)
pro se off.
TOTALCASES 123 36 9 2 1 4 1 0 8 184 122
BURDEN ON COL R 1 -16 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fao. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS InmateDiscrim. Filing
Days pending in 165.13 190.83 76.67 0 60 0 125 116.25 139.38 173.73
sia sponte dis.
Days pending for 808.97 663.33 445.63 0 0 535 0 370 600 791.43
others
Days pending 831 1056.67 675 0 0 0 0 0 840 831
with app. coansel
Docket entries in 8.33 8.5 7.67 0 6 0 6 10.75 7.75 8.35
sua sponte dis.
Docket entries 32.79 22.05 17 0 0 48 0 18 19.5 33.8
for others
Docket entries
with app. coansel 47 .8 29.33 26.5 0 0 0 0 0 28 47.8
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BuRDN ON COuRT-1997 CASES
Empl y, InmateCiv. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS FilingDiscrim. ili
Days pending inr
Days pedig.i 178.70 359.17 265 235 110 0 0 0 166. 88 165.63
Days pending for 591.36 525.94 502.78 0 0 0 0 740 573. 33 557.89
others
Days pending 390 948.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 390
with app. counsel
Docket entries in
aua sponie dis. 9.32 15.33 10.67 6 16 0 0 0 7.44 28.09
Docket entriesDoters 23.8 21.81 12.33 0 0 0 0 35 19.5 17for others
Docket entries
with app. consel 23 38.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Cases 36 4 1 1 26
crepnwih0 0 0 0 0correspond. with (ave. 1.72) (ave. 1.75) (ave. 1) (ave. 1)pro se off. "(v.1 ae .8
TOTAL CASES 71 28 24 I 1 0 0 1 12 138 61
BURDEN ON COURT--1998 CASES
Ci.Rgt Emloy'ImtC .Rih y. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FO1A Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmatev ih.Discrim. Fiding
Days pending in 179.34 301.67 730 0 0 360 115 0 114 178.33
sua sponte dis.
Days pending for 496.92 378.57 424.4 0 0 0 0 442.5 452 468.92
others
Days pending 5775 0 345 0 0 0 0 0 0 5775
with app. counsel
Docketeniriesn 9.66 10.17 7 0 0 8 I1 0 5.8 9.72
sua sponte dis.
Docket entries 19.36 17.86 14.6 0 0 0 0 24.75 25.4 20.36
for others
Docket entries
with app. consel 29.5 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 29.5
Cases 42 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
prose off. (ave. 1.62) (ave. 1.25) (ave. 1.33) (ave. 2)
TOTAL CASES 62 21 27 0 0 1 1 4 10 126 56
BURDEN ON COURT-1999 CASES
Civ. Right. Employ. Soc. Sec. Hous. Fam. Divers. FOIA Lab. Oth. TOTALS Inmate
Discrim. TOTALS Filing
Days pending in 162.17 174.09 236.67 315 0 142.5 0 0 130.42 173.94
sua sponte dis.
Days pending for 5 317 268.75 0 0 0 525 0 0 385
others 38
Days pending 555 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 555
with app. counsel
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BURDEN ON COURT-1999 CASES
Docket entries in 7.69 9.09 7 7 0 6 0 0 7.55 7.14
sua sponte dis.
Docket entrie'sforkoters 20.57 19.8 11.13 0 0 0 20 0 0 20.57for others
Docket entries
wihapp.ounsel 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
Cases 5 2 31
correspond. with (ave. 2.61) (ave. 2) (ave. 1.5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 (ave 181)
pro se off. I
TOTAL CASES 86 23 14 3 0 2 1 0 14 143 68
s
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